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**SECURITY COMMUNITIES IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC:
ANALYSIS OF AUSTRALIAN SECURITY POLICY
DIRECTION 2009-2015**

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The Asia-Pacific region is currently under strategic changes, as China is rising in political, military and economic terms, and the United States has launched a rebalancing policy to the region. Australia, who shares a security treaty with the United States but has China as its largest trade partner, is greatly impacted by these changes.

This case study analyzes Australian security policy with United States and China from 2009 to 2015 through the constructivist theory of security communities. The study asks has Australia moved closer to building a security community within Asia, as it attempted in the 1980’s and 1990’s. It continues the work of Higgott and Nossal (1998), who argued that Australia did not manage to create security ties with the region due to lack of shared values and “we-ness” with the region.

Through content analysis of Australian security policy documents and statements, this study shows that Australian security policy is greatly impacted by the tightly coupled security community it shares with the U.S. Australia has created two images of Asia: in the realm of economic policy, it is ready to embrace the region and benefit from the integration. In the area of security policy, however, Australia still relies on the alliance with United States, while depicting Asia as conflictual and possibly dangerous to Australia’s interests. Australia has not been able to overcome its strategic culture, based on realist assumptions of the world, in order to extend the cooperation and transactions evident at so many levels with China into the level of security policy. Rather, it has kept these two worlds separate and without much critical thinking from the point of view of its own national interests, has supported the United States in its rebalancing process to Asia.

This case study finds that while Australia is has not formed a new security community in the region, it could be due to the influence of the United States and the close cooperation between Australia and the United States.

Tämä pro-gradututkielma on tapaustutkimus Australian ulko- ja turvallisuuspolitiikan kehityssuunnasta suhteessa Kiinaan ja Yhdysvaltoihin vuosina 2009 – 2015. Australia on keskisuuri valtio Aasian ja Tyynenmeren alueella, missä geopolittinen tilanne on muuttumassa. Kiinan nopea taloudellinen, poliittinen ja sotilaallinen kasvu on haastanut Yhdysvaltojen hegemonisen aseman alueella. Kiinan nousu ja toisaalta Yhdysvaltojen ulkopolitiikan painotus Aasian ja Tyynenmeren alueelle (”rebalance to Asia-Pacific”) tuovat haasteita erityisesti Australialle, joka on turvallisuusyhteisössä Yhdysvaltojen kanssa mutta jonka suurin kauppakumppani on Kiina.

Tutkimuksessa analysoidaan Australian ulko- ja turvallisuuspolitiikkaa turvallisuusyhteisöjen teorian näkökulmasta. Turvallisuusyhteisöt ovat konstruktivistinen lähestymistapa turvallisuuspolitiikkaan, missä valtioiden toimintaa analysoidaan inressien ja identiteettien avulla. Higgott ja Nossalin (1998) mukaan Australian pyrkimykset tiiviimpään turvallisuuspoliittiseen yhteisöön Tyynenmeren ja Aasian alueella epäonnistuivat, sillä Australia ei jakanut samoja arvoja ja identiteettejä alueen maiden asukkaiden kanssa. Tämä tutkimus jatkaa Higgottin ja Nossalin tutkimusta ja pyrkii selittämään, mihin suuntaan Australia kehittää suhteitaan Yhdysvaltoja ja Kiinaa kohtaan.

Tutkimuksessa selvisi, että Australian ulko- ja turvallisuuspolitiikan suunta määrittyy vahvasti Yhdysvaltojen turvallisuusyhteisön kautta. Australian virallisen linjan mukaan Tyynenmeren ja Aasian alue on sille erittäin tärkeä, mutta konkreettisissa päätöksissään se on asettunut tukemaan Yhdysvaltojen painotusta alueelle ja sitoutunut esimerkiksi Yhdysvaltojen tukikohdan perustamiseen Australian pohjoisosiin. Australian turvallisuuspoliittisissa dokumenteissa luodaan kaksi kuvaa Aasiasta: yhtäältä halutaan lisätä yhteistyötä, integraatiota ja taloudellista kanssakäymistä. Toisaalta taas turvallisuuspolitiikan saralla Aasian maat nähdään uhkaavina Australian intresseille. Turvallisuusyhteistyö Kiinan kanssa on aluillaan, mutta tähän mennessä Australia on pitäytynyt vahvasti vanhassa turvallisuusyhteisössä Yhdysvaltojen kanssa ja se vaikuttaa maan kykyyn integroitua alueen muiden maiden kanssa.

Key words: security communities, Asia-Pacific, Australia, rebalancing, security

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1. Introduction

Michael Mastanduno observed in 2002 the following: *“The United States has crafted a hegemonic strategy for the Asia-Pacific to serve its own geopolitical and economic interests. Yet, in the process, U.S hegemony is also making important contributions to regional order. Hegemony has promoted order, but it is also important to recognize the limitations of U.S hegemony as the principal mechanism for regional order”*.¹ In 2015, United States still holds a hegemonic position in the world and in the Asia-Pacific region. Yet since Mastanduno’s remarks, American power is not as significant as it was before.² China’s rising power has significantly challenged that of the United States.³ China’s unprecedented economic growth has led many to question the role of the United States in the future and the military impacts China’s growth could have.⁴ Global economic crisis that started from the United States in 2008 sent shock waves through the world and especially impacted the American and European economies. At the same time, China has become the second largest economy in the world that could be able to take over the United States in the next decade.⁵ Despite the global crisis, China averaged growth above 9 percent in 2008-2010.⁶ It has become more influential in international affairs by joining international organizations and modernizing its military forces.⁷ China has also grown more assertive in regional matters, especially by stating claims over the territory of the South China Sea.⁸ United States has responded by recognizing the importance of Asia in the global politics of the 21st century and commencing a new foreign policy process in 2011, *“rebalance to Asia”*, which officially aims to focus diplomatic, economic and military efforts to Asia-Pacific.⁹ No country can escape the effects of these developments, but Australia is in a unique position to both gain and lose from the future. Australia’s position thus offers an interesting viewpoint for the analysis of the strategic situation in the Asia-Pacific.¹⁰

¹ Mastanduno 2002, 196.

² Kang 2007, 200.

³ China’s rise in economic, military and political power has been reviewed in detail elsewhere. See for example Kang 2007, 12-16.

⁴ See for example Ikenberry, 2008.

⁵ Yuan 2014, 7.

⁶ OECD Economic Surveys China Overview 2013, 4.

⁷ Kang 2007, 3.

⁸ For an overview on the disputes,

<<http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/international/countriesandterritories/china/territorial-disputes/index.html>>.

⁹ Clinton 2011, 58.

¹⁰ See Charlton et al. 2009, 297.

Australia has always been divided between two worlds in international politics: East and West. As a settler society bound to the British Empire, it has been close to Europe and the United States both in cultural and security matters. Since the Second World War, Australia has officially been in a military alliance with the United States. The Australia, New Zealand and United States Security Treaty (ANZUS) was signed in 1951. New Zealand was excluded by the United States from the treaty in 1989 but Australia and New Zealand still hold security ties together. Geographically, Australia is part of the Asia-Pacific, however, and the region has become increasingly important to Australian economy over the last years. For decades, Australia has enjoyed the peace and prosperity of the region. Its trade is now focused within the region, rather than with United Kingdom and United States as it traditionally was. China overtook Japan as Australia's biggest trade partner in 2007 and is also an important source of business for Australia's tourism and education industry. The demand for natural resources and agricultural products from Asia has largely shielded Australia from the impacts of the global financial crisis.¹¹

As the regional balance shifts, a lot of debate now focuses on how Canberra should alter its policies in order to adapt to the changes and ensure Australia's security and economic prosperity in the future. Questions are raised especially regarding Australia's position and choices should a conflict arise between China and the United States or Taiwan.¹² Relationship between China and the United States largely determines whether the future of the region will be peaceful or conflictual, but this dissertation shows that Australia's position is not only defined by that relationship.

The original idea for this study came from the dilemma Australia is facing in the future, should the relationship between United States and China become more competitive. Australia's dependence on China for trade and United States for security can create problems in the future. However, the relationship between China and United States is not the only question impacting Australia's position. Even though the debate recently has largely focused on the relationship of United States and China, I argue that this is a result of Australia's close partnership (a "security community") with the United States. As the more powerful partner, United States been able to choose the direction of the security community and thus influence Australian foreign policy discussion. Academic research should consider the implications of Australia's own choices that are already visible. Security community with the United States has centered Australian foreign

¹¹ Commonwealth of Australia, 2012.

¹² See White 2011; Ayson 2012; Behm 2003; Beeson 2003; Dongxiao, 2003.

policy debate around themes that are important to the Americans, rather than focusing on Australia's interests. This dissertation focuses on the way Australian officials have developed the security policy regarding United States and China, with the theoretical framework of security communities.

As O'Neill argues, most discussion regarding the possible threats facing Australia has been government and policy level writing rather than academic literature. He notes that the academic discussion on Australia's strategic position and security threats has mainly been focused on past challenges instead of engaging in debate regarding future developments.¹³ The focus of this thesis show the recent changes all affect the region and Australia in the future, hopefully adding to this academic discussion that O'Neill calls for.

1.1. The case: Australian foreign policy dilemma

“Few countries have as self-consciously sought to ‘relocate’ themselves in international politics economically, diplomatically and militarily – as Australia did in the 1980s and 1990s.”¹⁴

Australia's relationship with the United States can be analyzed through theories that deal with alliances and consider the material implications of the partnership. These theories, such as neorealism, would consider threat perception to be the most important factor holding the alliance together.¹⁵ The alliance is considered to be a result of a cost and benefit analysis, where material benefits such as security guarantee from the U.S and access to its technology are the keys in explaining the cooperation.¹⁶ Liberal theorists would look at the economic interdependence and cooperation and how the relationship has institutionalized over the years.¹⁷ All these aspects are important factors in understanding Australia's position yet they exclude important parts from the analysis, such as the significance of social learning and collective identity formation between Australia and the United States or Australia and Asia. The theory of Security communities, based on constructivism, provides a wider framework for the analysis.

The purpose of this dissertation is to review previous academic work regarding Australian foreign and security policy and to add to it. To analyze Australia's foreign and security policy

¹³ O'Neill 2011, 21.

¹⁴ Higgott & Nossal 1997, 169.

¹⁵ See Walt, 1987.

¹⁶ See Bisley, 2013.

¹⁷ Chernoff, 2007, 60.

developments, the theory framework of *security communities* is utilized.¹⁸ Australia's position can be viewed as a struggle to carve out a place for the country in international relations and central to this struggle is the role of Australian identity and values and how they conflict and interact with the need for security. The starting point for this dissertation is Higgott and Nossal's work regarding Australia's search for a new security community in the 1980's and 1990's.¹⁹ Higgott and Nossal employed the theory of security communities in their analysis of how Australia aimed to shift from the western security community to a regional, Asian community. The process was initiated by the leadership of the Labor governments, but the transition wasn't easy. Historically, Australians have viewed Britain and other western countries as a cultural "home" and distance themselves from geographically close neighbors, such as Indonesia, whose values and political system are seen to be too far away from liberal Australia. During the efforts to move Australia closer to Asia a lot of economic cooperation took place but there was no significant change in the security framework.²⁰

Higgott and Nossal argue that if Asian countries will develop their institutions in response to the growing power of China, then it is not likely that Australia would be part of a new security architecture. The lack of shared identity became the biggest obstacle for creating a new community especially in regards to security. In order to move forward, both Australians and Asians would have to embrace the sense of community and hold similar values.

The focus of this dissertation is to look at the developments since the study of Higgott and Nossal. They argue that the main reason for Australia's "failure" to move from the old security community to a new, Asian community, was the lack of "we-ness" and shared values. They found that Australia still relied on U.S security guarantees, whether that was realistic or not, and that Australia was not likely to become part of a new security framework in Asia, should one come to exist.²¹ The Liberal Howard government came into power in 1996 and his foreign policy is widely seen as having taken Australia closer to the United States, highlighted by the support in the American war on terror and the consequent wars.²² This dissertation concerns Australia's foreign policy after the Howard government, during 2009 to 2015. The Howard emphasized strategic relationship with the United States to the extent that he was willing to

¹⁸ Adler and Barnett, 1998.

¹⁹ Higgott and Nossal, 1998.

²⁰ Ibid, 1998.

²¹ Higgott and Nossal 1998, 287.

²² Yuan 2014, 11; Tow, 185-186.

sacrifice Australia's other, mainly economic, interests.²³ Since then, however, there have been a lot of disagreement on Australia's position and direction and therefore I will analyze the recent developments.

1.2 Previous research and research questions

As previously mentioned, Australian foreign policy has attracted a lot of academic and policy level debate in the recent years. There are diverging views on the role of China in Australia's economic prosperity, the meaning of ANZUS to Australia's security and the direction Australia should take for the future. I will not be able to present all the relevant work on the topic in this chapter, but will present some of the most influential opinions and arguments.

Australia's actions regarding security and trade is seen to originate from a realist tradition within the Australian economic and security communities. Beeson argues that Australian strategic thinking has been dominated by the realist tradition and it is also restraining the country's trade policy. He notes that the decision to increase U.S military presence is a reminder of a Cold War era containment strategy rather than the building of a new order for the region. There are also few aims to counterbalance the dependence on China regarding trade and creating new trade policies.²⁴ Many argue that Australia should radically alter its policies regarding Asia, and to understand the meaning of the region to its future. Hugh White maintains in his much discussed essay "*Power shift: Rethinking Australia's Place in the Asian Century*" that Australians have long been in denial regarding China's rise and the future of Asian political developments. White notes that Australia has been able to build good relations throughout the region and remain close allies with the United States only because of the dominant power of the U.S. He claims that as the power structure is changing and China is gaining a lot of new economic and political power, Australia can no longer be ambivalent and has to make a choice. White asserts that as China grows, it will want more power and growth, while the U.S will be trying to contain this rise. In White's opinion, Australia should encourage the United States to share power with China, instead of challenging it.²⁵ ²⁶ Here the choice is to look towards East, where the economic growth comes from, rather than the old world of the ANZUS alliance.

²³ Beeson 2003, 203.

²⁴ Ibid, 198.

²⁵ White 2011, 82.

²⁶ Ibid, 82-83.

Conversely, Bisley makes a case that Australia is not in a conflicting position. He notes that Australia's alliance with the United States has a strong domestic support and Australian elite views that the region is better off with the primacy of the United States now and in the future.²⁷ The debate about Australia's foreign policy and strategic position is then also a debate on how people view the global political change more generally.

Robert Ayson argues that Australia's independence in foreign policy will decrease should the conflicts between China and the United States escalate. He notes that so far, Australia has kept its defence policy with the United States and economic and cultural relationship with China separate. There hasn't been enough thinking on how these two relationships should integrate. He maintains that the unique strategic location that provides Australia benefits might also make it vulnerable to competition and conflict in the future.²⁸ This position, being between West and East and not quite belonging to either one, is described by Higgott and Nossal as "liminality". They argue that the two worlds do not sit easily together and it might be difficult for Australia to step away from this liminal location, to properly belong to either world.²⁹ As much as White and others argue that Australia should alter its policy and turn towards Asia, this might not be such a simple policy change after all. This dissertation will argue that Australia's existing security community with the United States already impacts its position greatly and hinders opportunities to move towards China and Asia regarding security policy.

First, I will offer an overview and analysis of Australia's foreign and security policy in the changing security system of the Asia-Pacific region in the new century. I will focus on the challenges that the rising power of China on one hand and the attempt by the Obama government to counter this development by focusing on the region, affects Australia's position. I will also give some background on the historical aspects regarding Australian foreign policy. The research question is as follows: ***how and why has Australia developed its relationship with the United States and China in light of the rebalancing process and the rising power of China in 2009 - 2015?*** The main focus is in the relationship between Australia and the United States, who have an existing security community. The timeframe includes the governments of Prime Minister Kevin Rudd (Labor, 2008-2010), Julia Gillard (Labor 2010-2013), Kevin Rudd (Labor 2013) and the current Coalition government of Prime Minister Tony Abbott (2013-). The focus

²⁷ Bisley 2013, 415-416..

²⁸ Ayson 2012, 356-357.

²⁹ Higgott and Nossal 1997, 172-173.

of this analysis is on *elite* opinion, presented in official statements and security policy documents. Source material for the analysis are security policy papers (Defence White Papers 2009 and 2013, Australia in the Pacific Century White Paper 2012, National Security Strategy 2013), in addition to statements by political leaders in Australia and the United States.

2. Australia's foreign policy: looking East or West?

“Australia, we suggest, has increasingly become a state in international politics that sits uneasily between two worlds in security terms.”³⁰

“Recasting Australia's national identity was seen as a precondition for acceptance into the region's fora and collaboration; being accepted was felt necessary to further both military security and trade interests.”³¹

2.1. Politics of identity: Australian foreign policy and strategic culture

Australia is a geographically isolated country, located between Indian and Pacific Oceans. It belongs to the Western cultural sphere and has colonial roots as part of the Great Britain. Yet by geography Australia is part of Asia³², neighboring world's largest Muslim country Indonesia. Australia is a vast island nation rich in natural resources, with a small population (23 million), making it a very important partner to growing Asian economies and especially China. It is also a “middle power” and by definition, middle powers are not able change their strategic reality on their own, as they are in a subordinate position in the hierarchy of states.³³ Australia's size and isolation, being the world's sixth largest country with over 60 000 kilometres of coastal line, also influences its strategic position and outlook in the region.³⁴ As a sparsely populated and isolated nation, Australia's armed forces have to be able to protect an entire continent. This geographical position has led to Australia seeking security through alliances.³⁵ It is argued that

³⁰ Higgott and Nossal 1998, 265.

³¹ Pettman 2005, 162.

³² Concept of Asia is a highly debated one. I follow Jain's classification (2007) that “Defining Asia has been a major task for many scholars. Avoiding this definitional exercise, it is important simply to note that discussion is focused on East, Southeast, and South Asia and that the Middle East and Central Asia are not considered here.” Specifically this dissertation deals with states belonging to Northeast Asia (China, Japan) and Southeast Asia (Taiwan, ASEAN states, New Zealand and Australia). (Kang 2007, 11)

³³ Beeson 2013, 199.

³⁴ Commonwealth of Australia, Department of Prime Minister and the Cabinet 2013, 7.

³⁵ Cotton 2003, 29.

Australia's strategic culture is marked by an existing anxiety about invasion and of potential threats and a sense of separateness from the region. The country has a fondness to alliances and yet almost equally strong preference to self-reliance. Key factors impacting the strategic thinking are also the belief in armed forces and obedience to the idea of a state as the key factor in security policy.³⁶ Yet Australian continent has only been attacked once, by Japan during the World War two.

Australia was part of the British Empire until Australian federation was created in 1901.³⁷ Numerous changes took place in Asia after the Second World War and caused Australia to worry about its own position, which also reflected on the need for a closer relationship with the United States. Most South East Asian countries became independent from colonial rule, Indonesia being the most important for Australia due to the proximity. After relying on United Kingdom for security in the past, the loss of British power in Singapore and in the region were seen as a strategic shock to Australia. It quickly sought help from another powerful country, United States.³⁸ Australia's foreign and security policy is often depicted as having realist traits or being based on realist assumptions of the world.³⁹ The realist world view and high sense of insecurity can be seen to flow from Australia's position in the region: it is a liberal country surrounded by non-western neighbors with different values and non-democratic societies. This position can lead states to looking for military allies and to ignore non-military means of building security.⁴⁰ This argument support Higgott and Nossall's conclusions on why Australia didn't succeed in building an effective security framework with regional neighbors.

United States and Australia worked closely together in the war against Japan in the Pacific and in 1951, Australia, New Zealand and the United States signed ANZUS⁴¹ security treaty. The treaty promised help from the U.S should Australia again come under a military attack. In 1949, Communist People's Republic of China was formed and became the main concern for Australia and the U.S, again promoting cooperation. Australian participation in wars in Asia in the 1950's and 1960's (the Korean and the Vietnam War) is viewed as a reaction against communist expansion and as a way of forming closer ties to the U.S. Fear of communism during the Cold War promoted cooperation with the United States and made the military ties between the two

³⁶ White 2002, 257.

³⁷ Pettman 2005, 161.

³⁸ Pettman 2005, 161-162.

³⁹See: Beeson 2013; McCraw 2011.

⁴⁰ McCraw 2011, 169.

⁴¹ New Zealand was excluded from the treaty by United States 1989 due to its anti-nuclear policy and ban on nuclear operated vessels.

countries closer.⁴² Thus the military alliance confirmed Australia's identity as Western and was the beginning of the "forward defence" –policy. The purpose of the forward defence was to actively fight dangers overseas, before they could become a threat to Australia.⁴³ This policy was manifested in the participation of the wars in Asia. In the 1960's United States announced the Guam doctrine, United States would keep its alliance commitments yet expected its allies to carry more responsibility for their own defence. This policy prompted Australian policy makers to consider that United States would not act as the security guarantor for the region and thus Australia would have to seek to deal with Asia directly.⁴⁴ Slowly Australia began to form closer ties with the region that it had originally feared and tried to keep at distance with strict immigration policies and by relying on Western cooperation.

Since then, Australia's position towards the alliance on the one hand and the region and multilateral cooperation on the other, has varied over the years. Generally, the labor governments have prioritized multilateral cooperation and close relationships with China and other Asian nations. During the Labor governments of Hawke (1983-1991) and Keating (1991-1996), Australia was interested in more than merely economic cooperation with Asian countries. Defence policy shifted and Keating announced that Australia was seeking security *within* Asia, rather than security *from* Asia. In 1996, a liberal Howard government took power and the focus moved back to the United States and Europe. Asia was mainly seen important in economic, not cultural or security, terms.⁴⁵ Prime minister Howard argued that Australia could trade and have a close relationship with Asia without giving up on its own values and without Asia influencing Australia's domestic culture.⁴⁶ This discussion shows how closely Australian identity and sense of national values and history are linked to the process of forming economic and military relations.

Howard's coalition government (1996-2007) changed the direction of Australian foreign policy and actively supported the American alliance on the cost of engagement with Asia.⁴⁷ The Howard period can be seen as a step away from multilateral cooperation and close relations with Asia. Instead, Australia came to be seen as a "sheriff of U.S" in the region as it firmly supported Washington over Beijing in many issues.⁴⁸ Howard's government also affected the

⁴² Behm 2003, 185; Charlton et al. 2009, 298; McCraw 2011, 170.

⁴³ Pettman 2005, 162.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ Jain 2007, 33-34.

⁴⁶ Ahluwalia et al, 2010, 62, 63.

⁴⁷ Jain 2007, 39.

⁴⁸ Tow 2003, 188-189.

national stand on immigration. Jock argues that during the Howard era, multiculturalism was replaced by “integration” when describing Australia’s policy regarding new immigrants.⁴⁹ The turn away from multiculturalism thus occurred both at the level of foreign policy and also in national policy making.

As the United States is refocusing its foreign policy towards Asia, Australia has again worked closely with its ally in security matters. The tight security alliance with United States and growing economic dependence on China leaves Australia in a strategically challenging position.

2.2. United States alliance and the rebalance to Asia

“The US rebalance provides Australia with new opportunities for cooperation with the United States and regional countries to build regional cooperation and capacity”⁵⁰

“The United States has crafted a hegemonic strategy for the Asia-Pacific to serve its own geopolitical and economic interests.”⁵¹

Australia and the United States have a long standing, close relationship in economic, diplomatic and strategic terms. The United States has been Australia’s most important partner when it comes to security since the signing of the ANZUS treaty in 1951. Australia has since participated in every major US-led war.⁵² ANZUS does not commit either party to act in each other’s defence, only to “consult”. The treaty has been criticized for its ambiguity but remains a central piece of Australian security framework.⁵³ The treaty was evoked for the first time when Australia supported United States after the terrorist attacks in September 2001 (referred to as 9/11 from here on).⁵⁴ In addition to the military treaty, the U.S. alliance is further enhanced by the shared language, culture and military cooperation of the past between the two countries.

⁴⁹ Collins 2007, 67.

⁵⁰ Commonwealth of Australia, 2013.

⁵¹ Mastanduno 2002, 196.

⁵² Cooper et al 2013, 3-4.

⁵³ Beeson 2003, 394-395.

⁵⁴ Obama, 2011.

Even though different White Papers have emphasized the meaning of the alliance differently, it remains the most central influence in Australian defence and national security and is used as a security guarantor. Despite the policy of self-reliance, it is recognized that Australia could not defend itself from a major attack alone, but would seek help from the United States. The alliance is a long standing part of Australia's foreign policy and at the practical level, interoperability with the U.S. shapes policy making.⁵⁵

Australian alliance with the United States is a form of security community, despite the distance between the two countries. Firstly, the members of the community view it impossible that force would be used in solving issues between them. Second, the security arrangements confirmed the "we-ness" of the members (Australians, Americans and New Zealanders) and also served as a way of separating them from the people outside the community, Asians. Thirdly, security and economy were closely connected as the security ties of Australia mirrored its economic relations, which were mainly focused to United Kingdom and United States in 1950's and 1960's.⁵⁶

As previously mentioned, after attempts to form closer ties with the region, Australia deepened its ties with the United States during the Howard government. In 2011, United States again became a relevant topic for Australian foreign policy. Obama's government, recognizing the importance of China's growth, announced the foreign policy process of "rebalance to Asia". The focus on Asia-Pacific is nothing new in the American history, but rather the United States is returning its focus to Asia after fighting costly wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. A rebalancing policy can be seen as reflecting historical continuity, rather than a new change in strategy.⁵⁷ From a European perspective it is easily forgotten that in addition to being an Atlantic authority, United States is also a Pacific power and has a long history of military and economic cooperation with the region. United States has been the leading western power in the region from 1930's onwards and continues to be so.⁵⁸

The rebalance comes at a time when United States is recovering from two major wars, fighting the effects of an economic crises and cutting back on its military expenses. Thus it aims to change the strategic way in which the military operates: instead of large consuming and

⁵⁵ Burns & Eltham 2014, 196.

⁵⁶ Higgott and Nossal 1998, 269.

⁵⁷ Harris 2014, 299.

⁵⁸ Buckley 2002, 230.

expensive military bases and operations, it will preference partnerships with allies and use rotational forces in Asia. In addition to practical reasons, rebalancing is an acknowledgment to the global importance of the Asia-Pacific region, which hosts nearly half of the world's population and most of the economic growth.⁵⁹ It can be seen as a way of forwarding costs to the allies in Asia as well, instead of Americans handling the cost of heavy military bases in the region. Strengthening relationships can be argued to be just a way of aiming to do more during financially difficult times.⁶⁰ As a part of the policy, United States has announced it will shift 60 percent of its navy ships to the region by 2020. It has already deployed littoral combat ships to Singapore and signed a new military arrangement with the Philippines. In Australia, United States gained more access to the northern territory by opening a military base in Darwin, which will host 2500 U.S soldiers rotationally.⁶¹ Rebalance process is not only military in its scope but in "*involves all aspects of the American power*".⁵⁵ This has been manifested by increased economic focus to the region (trade negotiations) and diplomatic efforts, such as visits in the region by state officials such as President Obama in 2011 and then Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in 2012.⁶²

One of the core issues regarding American policy in Asia is that United States has not been supportive of developing a multilateral security community, as it did in Europe after the Cold War. Rather it has pursued a hegemonic order where United States acts as the principal guarantor for the security in the region. This order is based on bilateral relationships rather than multilateral cooperation, particularly with Japan, South Korea and Taiwan.⁶³ Mastanduno argues that the United States has managed to establish a hegemonic order in the region and defused possible crises by helping to keep power rivals from engaging in conflict, by promoting liberal economic policy and by diffusing nationalist economic competition. Yet it has not been successful in addressing the underlying reasons of conflict and competition. In other words, United States has managed to hold a security order in place without actually establishing an enduring solution for the security problems in the region. In addition, United States has not been able to integrate China and India, the other two most powerful countries in the region alongside to Japan, in the security system.⁶⁴ Part of the U.S strategy in the Asia-Pacific is to rely on bilateral relationships that the U.S officials can control better than multilateral forums.

⁵⁹ Clinton 2011, 57.

⁶⁰ Harris 2014, 299.

⁶¹ Parrish, 2011; Ishihara et al, 2012.

⁶² The Sydney Morning Herald 16.11.2011; U.S Department of State 9.11.2012.

⁶³ Mastanduno 2002, 193-194.

⁶⁴ Ibid, 183-184.

During the North Korean nuclear crisis in 1994 U.S used ad hoc diplomacy and during the Asian Financial Crises, it rejected Japan's proposal for a regional financing program and preferring to rely on the International Monetary Fund (IMF) programs instead.⁶⁵ With the rebalancing process the United States can be seen to be continuing this hegemonic strategy, by strengthening the existing alliance framework and enhancing its own presence in the region in order to advance its interests in the region. It remains to be seen can this process be a success, especially since China's growing power might mean that it will not settle for the United States to act in a hegemonic way in the future.

It is not, however, the purpose of this paper to find the real meaning or implications of the rebalancing policy as a whole. This paper will take a narrow look at the rebalancing policy and how it affects the security framework in the Asia-Pacific from the Australian perspective. In a constructivist framework, the rebalancing process has impacts that extend beyond material factors. It influences the way that countries in the region view the U.S and its policy and how they interact with one another. This dissertation focuses specifically on the military and strategic implications of the policy.

2.3. Australia-China relationship: opportunities and doubts

“Australia welcomes China's rise, not just because of the social and economic benefits it has brought China's people, but also in recognition of the benefits that it has delivered to states around the globe. China's continued economic growth has been a positive contributor to the economies of Australia and other states, helping to offset the economic troubles of Europe and relatively low growth in the United States.”⁶⁶

Australia's relationship towards Asia has been described as “*ambivalent*”, as Asia has traditionally been seen both as a sign of hope and fear in Australia. Racist immigration policies of the past were seen as a way to preserve Australian “identity”.⁶⁷ The practical economic and security relationship with Asia has changed over the years depending on Australian domestic politics and the ruling party. The debate on Asia has always reflected the diverging world views on foreign policy and the world in general within the Australian elite.

⁶⁵ Ibid, 194-195.

⁶⁶ Commonwealth of Australia, Department of Defence 2013, 11.

⁶⁷ See Ahluwalia et al., 2010.

Despite the politics of identity, China and Asia increasingly matter to the prosperity of Australians. China has averaged a 9 percent economic growth since opening its markets in 1978.⁶⁸ It has become a major regional power and is now more active in international matters. Despite Australia's past policies and support for the U.S in fight of communism, relationship between the two countries has remained stable since 1972, when they formed a diplomatic relationship. China overtook Japan's place as Australia's most important trade partner in 2007 and is Australia's largest partner for exports and source of imports. China is also Australia's main source country for services such as education and tourism.⁶⁹ Australia has been careful in managing relations with Beijing and Washington, pursuing economic ties with Beijing while maintaining the cooperation under the military alliance with the United States. Australia has managed well to balance between these two competitors but the recently Sino-Australian relationship but differences could increase in the future.⁷⁰

There are different views on the importance of Australia's economic relationship with China. Bisley argues that Australia could just as easily replace China with other countries for its exports (mainly minerals), whereas White contends that China is the key to Australia's economic success in the future.⁷¹ He argues China has the capabilities in overtaking the United States as the world's largest economy due to its population size and that it has several options in achieving more influence in Asia region.⁷² There may be conflicting views on the level of influence China can have over Australia but there is no doubt that China is a very important economic partner to Australia. China ranks as Australia's first trade partner, with total two-way trade of 150 000 million dollars (AUS) in 2013. Japan comes second with almost half of that, 70 000 million, and United States third with 54 000 million dollars. It is also notable that Australia imports more from the United States than it exports, whereas it is the opposite with China and Japan.⁷³

Australia and China started to define the bilateral relationship "strategic partnership" in 2013. The two countries will now have annual leader level meetings and continue other diplomatic processes as well, such as Defence Strategic Dialogue between Australian Defence Force

⁶⁸ Kang 2007, 3; Chan, 2008.

⁶⁹ Yuan 2014, 26.

⁷⁰ Rigby et al 2011, 159.

⁷¹ Bisley 2013, 414; White 2011, 83.

⁷² White 2001, 83-84.

⁷³ Australian government, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2014.

(hereafter ADF) and People's Liberation Army (PLA hereafter).⁷⁴ There are also difficulties in the relationship, especially in regards to understanding each other's intentions. In Australia, negative public opinion surrounds Chinese investments in Australia and questions their purpose.⁷⁵ Australians are also worried that too much dependence on Chinese economy could leave it vulnerable.⁷⁶ Especially investments in sensitive areas such as agriculture have become issues. In 2012, 80 percent of Australians were against government allowing foreign companies to buy Australian farmland.⁷⁷ Too much focus on China also means that Australia's economic growth can easily be affected by the slowing down of Chinese economy.

At the time of the writing of this dissertation, China's economic growth has already slowed down. The World Bank estimated that China's growth would be around 7 percent for the next two years. Due to slowdown in Chinese economy, the price for iron ore has gone down, impacting Australian economy.⁷⁸ At the time of the writing it is impossible to estimate the future of Chinese economy and it is outside the aim of this dissertation. These events show that Australia is very dependent on Chinese demand for its product and this dependence can also reflect in the security relationship.

2.4. China's rise and political implications in the region

"The Government does not believe that Australia must choose between its long standing Alliance with the United States and its expanding relationship with China; nor do the United States and China believe that we must make such a choice."⁷⁹

"Pressure on Australia to accede to China's regional vision in Asia will only intensify in an environment where China's influence is rising relative to that of the US, and it will become harder for Australia to resist in the context of growing economic intimacy with Beijing."⁸⁰

The effect of China's growing power in terms of economy, military and population is significant in the Asia-Pacific. China's behavior has caused worry both internationally and in Australia,

⁷⁴ Commonwealth of Australia 2013, 61.

⁷⁵ Larum et al. 2012, 2.

⁷⁶ Cooper et al 2013, 3.

⁷⁷ Lowy Poll 2012, 4.

⁷⁸ World Bank 13.4.2015; The Economist 16.4.2015.

⁷⁹ Commonwealth of Australia, Department of Defence 2013, 11.

⁸⁰ O'Neill 2011, 26.

especially regarding the Taiwan Straits Crises in 1996 and the downing of a U.S spy plane in 2001.⁸¹ More recently, concerns over China's assertiveness in territorial disputes has given concern to neighbors and United States alike. China's growth and American relative decline are popular topics in the literature regarding Asia-Pacific and also evident in the Australian policy discussion. As O'Neill argues:

“Of all the developments in Asia, it is the shifting role of the major powers that will determine the region's future security dynamics. In recent years, it has been the rise of China and the relative declining influence of the United States that has been the dominant theme in commentary about major power dynamics in the region. Barring any major internal upheaval in China, this relative shift in Asia's balance of power will continue over the next one and half decades. While a strong degree of caution should be exercised in assuming US decline in coming years (recall the post-Vietnam propensity to exaggerate America's descent), there can be little doubt that China's ascent, both economically and politically, will continue to challenge America's seven-decade dominance of Asia.”⁸²

Thus while one should not over-emphasize the meaning of China's growth in relation to the power of United States, it will have some significant impacts to the region. This dissertation follows the view that although United States is still the strongest country globally, in Asia-Pacific, China has taken a competitors place regarding political and military influence.

Despite the economic growth and the fact that more and more Chinese are coming out of poverty, politically the country remains an authoritarian one party system. Government restricts people's freedom of expression, association, assembly and religion. Human Rights Watch report acknowledges that since the new leadership came into power in 2013, some positive steps have been taken, for example improving the position of internal migrants and to abolishing the system of arbitrary detentions called “re-education through labor”. However, at the same time, strict criteria for universities and party members has been introduced regarding “correct ideology” in order to warn against the dangers of international values and human rights, and to promote the government and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Activists are targeted with imprisonment and torture, and the freedom of the press and the use of internet is curtailed, limiting citizens' opportunities to push for a change.⁸³

⁸¹ Charlton et al. 2009, 300.

⁸² O'Neill 2011, 26.

⁸³ Human Rights Watch, 2015.

For countries such as Australia, that promote liberal and democratic values and a rules based international system, the Chinese political system is a problematic factor in the management of the bilateral relationship. It can also complicate the management of diplomatic communication. In November 2014, Prime Minister Tony Abbott was criticized by the media and experts after celebrating the importance of president Xi's promise that China will be democratic by 2050. *"I have never heard a Chinese leader declare that his country will be fully democratic by 2050. I have never heard a Chinese leader commit so explicitly to a rule-based international order founded on the principle that we should all treat others as we would be treated ourselves."*, Mr. Abbott noted in his speech.⁸⁴ Commentators observed that president Xi's statement was actually nothing new and the Chinese concept of socialist democracy differs profoundly from that of the Western idea of freely contested elections. President Xi actually made no promise of true democratization and Abbott misinterpreted his words and intentions.⁸⁵ By the American media it was considered especially embarrassing by showing lack of understanding of Australia's leading trade partner, especially as the comments came right after the announcement of Australia-China free trade agreement.⁸⁶ This rather small incident shows how difficult the navigation of diplomatic, trade and security relationship between an authoritarian yet market oriented China and a liberal democratic Australia can be.

There are various views on how to interpret China's rise and how it affects international relations, ranging from the realist perceptions to liberalism to constructivism.⁸⁷ Theories most commonly used to explain the developments in Asia, neo-realism and neo-liberalism, view a growing power as destabilizing and that a reaction from its neighbors is to be expected. Power transition theory, used commonly in analysis of China's rise, also suggests that the rising power will challenge current power in terms of military and political power. In this case, U.S should prepare for military confrontation with China.⁸⁸ So far, however, China's growth has not caused a strategy of containment in East Asia; rather a mix of different strategies from engagement to hedging.⁸⁹ Chang argues that neighbors of the rising power do not usually organize themselves to form a balancing coalition, unless there is serious provocation.⁹⁰ This dissertation has a narrow focus and that is to examine how Australian government approaches the issue.

⁸⁴ Abbott, 17.11.2014.

⁸⁵ The Australian 22.11.2014; The Guardian 17.11.2014; The New York Times 18.11.2014.

⁸⁶ New York Times, 18.11.2014.

⁸⁷ Mearsheimer 2014; Kang 2007.

⁸⁸ Chan 2008, xi.

⁸⁹ Kang 2007, 4-5; Dongxiao 2003, 172.

⁹⁰ Chan 2008, xi.

2.5. Potential for conflict: Territorial disputes in the Asia-Pacific

As Asian economies grow and their population consume more, natural resources and naval routes to deliver them become strategically important. China and Japan both have growing need for energy imports. Japan relies on imports 99 percent for its oil and gas, while China's coastal area also has a lack of energy resources. Need for energy has led to conflicting claims over maritime territory in the East China Sea, especially over the contested Senkaku/Diaoyu islands.⁹¹ China has asserted that it will never give the sovereign right to Diaoyu islands⁹² while the United States has warned China not to start a conflict with its allies.⁹³ In the South China Sea, China, Vietnam, Taiwan, Malaysia, and Brunei have disputing claims over territory and the use of natural reserves. China's policy is to deal with the issues bilaterally, while other nations hope to achieve results from multilateral mediation.⁹⁴ Maritime issues could have serious implications to the relationship between the countries and thus for the Australian position as a U.S ally and China's trade partner.

From a constructivist point of view, China's rise in material power per se is not the cause of problems; China's identity and interests largely define if the future in Asia will be peaceful or conflictual. The issue of Taiwan remains the most serious issue and has not thus far been solved. China views Taiwan as part of itself; many countries think it should be sovereign nation.⁹⁵ This issue could bring the relationship between China and the United States under strain. The challenge for the Australian foreign policy is to understand better Chinese political culture and what they aim to achieve in the region.⁹⁶

⁹¹ Kent 2006, 139.

⁹² Islands in the East China Sea are called Senkaku in Japan and important for both nations.

⁹³ Cooper, 2014.

⁹⁴ The New York Times 23.9.2014; 15.12.2014.

⁹⁵ Kang 2007, 5, 9.

⁹⁶ Australian government has outlined concrete plans in order to increase cultural understanding of China and Asia in all sectors, such as business and policy making, in the *Australia in the Asian Century White Paper, 2012*.

3. Theory framework

3.1. Constructivism in explaining foreign policy

“(...) it is interests and identity, not power, that are the key variables in determining threat and stability in international relations.”⁹⁷

Traditionally, a state's foreign and security policies have been explained through neo-realism and neoliberal institutionalism, where states' identity and interests are seen to be constant and exogenous. I analyze Australia's foreign policy by utilizing a constructivist view point. A constructivist approach to the study of International Relations originates from the understanding that as human beings we are reflective actors: we can contemplate, anticipate and work to change our social and material environments. We have long term intentions in addition to immediate needs and wants. Constructivism considers that structures are social as well as material and that actors and structures are mutually constitutive, meaning that social and material environments socialize and constrain individuals.⁹⁸ There is an “*on-going, interactive dynamic between structure and agency mediated through social discourse*”.⁹⁹ States' identities are seen as evolving and a result from interaction with other states and actors. It follows that states do not always know in advance what their interests are or how to attain them.¹⁰⁰ Constructivism emphasizes intentions, ideas and communication in explaining international relations and how states operate.

Constructivists share a view that identity is crucial to the construction of security. Identity is not only endogenous but an internal process and one that is affected by systemic interaction. Thus, regional level interaction can transform identities. Conventional constructivists believe that it is possible to discover a state's national interest through analysis and find why states act in the way they do. This approach shows there is a causal connection between *identity* and *interests*.¹⁰¹ Identity is what makes things what they are; yet it can only be associated with intentional actors. Identity is then a unit-level quality and part of an actor's self-understanding. It is also a social construction, however, since the meaning of identity depends on others' perception of the actor. This way identity also has a systemic quality, it is formed by both

⁹⁷ Kang 2007, 9.

⁹⁸ George and Bennett 2005, 129.

⁹⁹ Nadkarni 2010, 13.

¹⁰⁰ Dongxiao 2003, 167.

¹⁰¹ McDonald 2008, 62.

external and internal structures.¹⁰² Identities refer to who or what actors *are* and interests imply what actors *want*. These two concepts have to be analyzed together, since identity alone does not explain action but without interests, identities have no motivational force. Subjective interests are the beliefs that states have about how to achieve their identity needs. They motivate behavior and rationalists use the word “preference” to describe it.¹⁰³

National identities are important when in understanding how states view and act on threats in international matters. Constructivist analysis focuses on identity and interests yet acknowledges other factors such as military and economic power. Material capabilities create some of the constraints under which states have to operate, yet they alone do not explain states’ behavior.¹⁰⁴ As Katzenstein notes: *“In understanding political problems, we typically need to weigh the causal importance of different types of factors, for example, material and ideal, international and domestic”*.¹⁰⁵

National interest(s) plays an important part in any state’s decision making process regarding foreign and security policy. According to Wendt, states have a corporate identity which entails certain objective interests. He takes from George and Keohane (1980) the identification of three national interests (physical survival, autonomy and economic wellbeing) and adds fourth, *collective self-esteem*. Physical survival refers to the survival of the “state-society complex” and what constitutes as survival varies historically. Autonomy indicates state’s ability to control its resources and government and the level of preferred autonomy will vary between states. Economic well-being describes the ability to maintain the mode of production in a society and in addition, the state’s resources. In capitalist societies, economic wellbeing is now commonly associated with economic growth but again, this will not be the case with all types of societies. Finally, collective self-esteem refers to a group’s need for respect or status and can be expressed in many ways. Wendt argues that in order for states to survive, all four needs must be satisfied in the long run. They also set the limits to what states can do regarding their foreign policies.¹⁰⁶

3.2. Role of communities in explaining peace and conflict

¹⁰² Wendt 1999, 224.

¹⁰³ Ibid, 231-232.

¹⁰⁴ Kang 2007, 9, 18, 23.

¹⁰⁵ Katzenstein et al. 2010, 167

¹⁰⁶ Wendt 1999, 233-238.

The theory of security communities belongs to the constructivist paradigm of international relations. Constructivism assumes that the world of International Relations has both social and normative bases, as discussed in the previous chapter. In addition, it considers that states can become socialized into sharing norms and values. This process can lead to an international community, a unitary actor, or international community of multiple states which share norms and values. The theory of security communities further posits actors are capable of creating shared identities and norms that are linked to a stable peace. The theory does not deny the impact of material factors but rather considers that the social world is constituted both by knowledge and material forces.¹⁰⁷ The emphasis is on ideational matters and how states relate to each other. Rather than solely focusing on material factors, such as trade numbers and military power, concepts such as shared identity, connections between people and shared values are identified in states' security relationships. As Ellis writes on the concept of community and what it entails:

"In its most simplistic form, the international community represents the collective moral and ethical opinions of states. This is the classical perspective common among scholars of the interwar era. The international community, in this perspective, existed inasmuch as the states in the system developed common morals and principles and acted in accordance with them."

"In the broadest sense, then, an international community can be said to exist when there is among states some common identity, which leads to a self-conception of belonging to a common purpose or interest. Of course, it is problematic to simply assume the existence of a meaningful international community just by virtue of states pronouncing there to be a common identification and interest; indeed, defection from the strictures of the political community is always an option. But to the extent that states' identities and interests correspond to and complement the political community's, it can be surmised that states' behavior and actions will support the values and desired outcomes of the international community."¹⁰⁸

Theories explain the absence of war in international relations differently. Theory of security communities "*posits the possible relationship between the growth of a community and pacific relations*".¹⁰⁹ The theory has an underlying assumption that an international community is possible. Albeit states are the focus of the study, transnational forces are also taken into

¹⁰⁷ Adler and Barnett 1998, 10, 12, 29.

¹⁰⁸ Ellis 2009, 10.

¹⁰⁹ Adler and Barnett 1998, 13.

consideration. The interaction between states and interaction between societies are the focus of analysis, as they create mutual understanding and conditions for a community. Finally, the concept of security communities is a “*blend of idealism and realism*”, recognizing state interests and the possibility to overcome problems with cooperation and interaction while looking for solutions to avoid war and examining the conditions leading to peace. In a community states neither expect nor prepare for organized violence as the means to solve disagreements: “*A reasonable assumption, therefore, is that states do not undertake –indeed, do not consider- security actions that can be interpreted by others within the community as military threatening*”.¹¹⁰ A system of habits and practices of peaceful resolution of conflicts between members is required in a security community. This system (or governance) is based on shared values and identity and it also limits the state’s own sovereignty in that it acts on the behalf of the community, not only itself.¹¹¹

Adler makes a case that security communities are not mainly peaceful alliances or communities of liberal values, but rather communities that utilize co-operative practices that “*help diffuse peaceful change via self-restraint subjectivities*”. Shared norms and values are necessary for the creation and maintaining of a collective identity, but it is the *practices* that enable us to reproduce and spread these values. “*Communities of practice are intersubjective social structures that constitute the normative and epistemic ground for action, but they are also agents, made up of real people, who (---) affect political, economic and social change.*”¹¹²

As a concept the ‘*communities of practice*’ is versatile as it combines discursive aspect of social change and the act of doing it, in addition to the social space where structure and agency overlay and knowledge, power and community connect. Thus the concept helps to facilitate between structure and social action. Communities of practice are not official international actors but they coexist and intersect with them. They are different from networks in that they include more than just the sharing of information between people, groups and organizations. They involve *processes of social communication* and also *identity formation* that enable agents to define meanings, learn practices and implement political control.¹¹³ Communities of practice such as NATO have become an alternative instrument to balance of power and deterrence routines.¹¹⁴

¹¹⁰ Ibid, 6, 14-15, 34.

¹¹¹ Adler and Barnett 1998, 34-36.

¹¹² Adler 2008, 199-200.

¹¹³ Adler 2008, 200.

¹¹⁴ Ibid, 220.

In international relations studies, concept of community of practice facilitates with the agent-structure dilemma. The cognitive evolution enables one to study social processes and how they move from structure to agency and back. Communities of practice are at the same time both actors and structure (“background knowledge on which learning and identity generating practices are based”) providing a method to study both agency and structure, without leaving one aspect out.¹¹⁵

The theory of security communities offers a framework and concepts through which Australia’s foreign policy choices can be analyzed. Analyzing Australia’s security policy via the language of power and material factors would leave much to be explored. Theory that acknowledges the importance of *ideas*, *interaction* and *communication* behind security policy gives more depth to the analysis. In the next chapter, theory of security communities is explained in closer detail.

3.3. Security communities explained by Deutch et al. and Adler and Barnett

The theory of security communities was introduced by Karl Deutch and his colleagues in 1957.¹¹⁶ Security communities did not become a popular research area until after the end of the Cold War, when role of identity and norms began to be taken seriously in the study of International Politics.¹¹⁷ Adler and Barnett edited “*Security Communities*” (1998), where several authors utilize the theory. They created a framework to study security communities based on the concept from Deutch et al., developing it further by utilizing international relations’ more recent theory and empirical studies.

Deutch and his colleagues developed the theory of security communities in *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area* (1957). Deutch was interested in political communities that were able to prevent conflict occurring between their members. They define security community as a group of people who have become integrated. Integration is defined as having a sense of community within a territory, stable enough to create expectations for peaceful change among the populations. Sense of community refers to a belief that common issues can be resolved peacefully. The “*term peaceful change*” thus refers to a process of resolving social

¹¹⁵ Ibid, 221.

¹¹⁶ Deutch et al., 1957.

¹¹⁷ Adler and Barnett 1998, 9.

problems without resorting to large scale¹¹⁸ violence. Integration can occur in different ways and it does not always require merging states into a single unit. Deutch et al. use concepts of amalgamation, where previously independent units merge into one, and pluralistic communities, where states retain their independence and formal government. Pluralistic communities are more promising in terms of eliminating war over large areas, as they are easier to attain and are not as easily broken down. Yet the main political goal must be that of holding peace among members. Often leaders have wanted more from the integration – the ability to act together instead of only abolishing war between members. This ability, to act effectively towards common goals, requires deeper integration (amalgamation) and also brings a new risk of conflict between members.¹¹⁹ This dissertation – as well as the theory of Adler and Barnett – focuses on pluralistic security communities, which are also a far more common phenomena in the world than amalgamated communities. In a pluralistic community members remain independent states but cooperate in matters of security and foreign policy.

The concept of *community* challenges traditional views of security policy as a field of competition and power politics. It requires one to accept that there is a social character to international politics and that communities do exist at the international level. At the policy level, officials have started to use language that combines security with community. They see common values as a starting point for a security cooperation and that this cooperation will in turn deepen those shared values and links between states.¹²⁰ Deutchian perspective on the study of IR values ideas, norms and shared ideas as opposed to language of power and material forces. However, Deutch does not expect *all* interstate action to take place in an environment of a thick society: some interaction occurs in a world that reminds us of the neorealist view. Thus he questions the idea that interstate action could be explained *via one model* of the international environment.¹²¹ In the theoretical field of International Relations, the theory of security communities can be seen as looking for a way to explain both material and social aspects of security. The broad view Deutch et al. take on analyzing security relations can also become a problem since there is lack of definition on what should remain outside the analysis in order for it to be coherent.

¹¹⁸ Adler and Barnett (1998, 61) comment on Deutch's definition of large scale violence, as most consider that violence should not take place at all. They conclude that there can be small scale violence including a dyad in the security community, without the community necessarily falling apart.

¹¹⁹ Deutch et al 1957, 5-6, 31.

¹²⁰ Adler and Barnett 1998, 4-5.

¹²¹ Ibid, 8-9.

In order to create a security community, the members must share a “sense of community”. This is manifested in sympathy and loyalties, such as trust and mutual consideration. Sense of community is also described as a “*we-feeling*”, where partial identification regarding self-images and interests exists. Thus a sense of a community between the peoples must be more than belief in same propositions. Building a sense of community requires *habits of political behavior* from individuals and *traditions and institutions* from social groups or units, such as states. Social learning is the process that brings these habits to life, and slowly changing background conditions affect the learning process. States that are larger and more organized politically, administratively and economically, are more likely to form the cores of strengths around which security communities develop.¹²²

The members of the communities share identities, values and meanings; they have direct relations in different environments and they show reciprocity in relation to each other. This altruist behavior is based on knowing the other members of the community for a long time. This is not to say that actors in a community have no interest independent from each other. Members of a security community can still show rival behavior but they do not fear that violence will be used in solving conflicts between them. They come to share enough values with each other in order to eliminate the use of violence as an option and to work towards some goals regarding security together. As noted in the earlier chapter, building these mutual interests requires habits of political behavior at the individual level and also traditions and institutions at the state-level. There can be a formal alliance or not between members but usually the use of military means between members is officially prohibited or sanctioned.¹²³

As the theory is interested in how peaceful state might best be achieved between states, Deutch et al. theorize the conditions under which communities do come to exist. There are certain conditions that enable this process. Helpful, but not essential, background conditions for integration are *ethnic or linguistic assimilation*; *previous administrative union*; *strong economic ties*; and *foreign military threats*. While a foreign threat can provide a temporary push for cooperation, lasting community requires other motivations as well.¹²⁴ The absence of ethnic or linguistic similarity can deter collaboration but can be overcome by increased interaction.¹²⁵

¹²² Deutch et al 1957, 36-37.

¹²³ Adler and Barnett 1998, 31-35.

¹²⁴ Deutch et al 1957, 45.

¹²⁵ Ibid, 159.

Links of social communication or strong economic ties can thus override the lack of ethnic assimilation between peoples.

Other important conditions are: “*compatibility of major values that are relevant for political decision making; capacity of the participating governments to respond each other’s needs, messages and actions quickly, adequately and without using violence; and mutual predictability of behavior*”. The process which leads to these conditions is not necessarily a fixed one, but rather a fluid development. Integration is seen as progression where steps can be taken forward or backwards without jeopardizing the effort. Thus the concept is useful in evaluating the *direction* in which the relationship between countries is developing at a particular time. One should be careful not to assume that integration is permanent once it has been achieved.¹²⁶ The purpose of this dissertation is exactly that: to evaluate the level of integration and the direction of the relationship between Australia and the United States, in light of the growing power of China.

In addition to helpful and important conditions, two essential requirements exist for pluralistic communities. Essential conditions have to be present for integration to take place, yet they are not sufficient conditions alone. First condition is the *compatibility of major values* and the possibility of taking some values out of politics. For example, religion is a value that can be left out by accepting the differences. Such is the situation in United States, for example, where union was built on large numbers of peoples of Catholic and Protestant decent. Main values are those that have major importance for the domestic life of the countries involved and are also important to the relationship between those countries. Deutch et al. consider democracy and non-communist economy to be the most important values in the case of the North Atlantic Community. It is important to note, however, that incompatible values themselves do not present a danger or prevent countries from becoming a community.

“So far as the question of a security community is concerned, such forms of national power as moral influence or propaganda become dangerous only when linked to the control of armed forces”.¹²⁷

¹²⁶ Ibid, 122.

¹²⁷ Deutch et al 1957, 126.

Undemocratic form of government or different economic systems are not necessarily a reason why states could not become integrated. However, if those values are interlinked with a militarist ideology, cooperation becomes more difficult or impossible. Second, mutual responsiveness has to be present. Sense of community depends on more than just verbal commitment to certain values. Mutual responsiveness is built on trust and identification, which were mentioned earlier. States come to trust each other through social learning that is enabled via constant communication.¹²⁸ Undemocratic form of government can become an obstacle for cooperation as it also impacts the process of decision making in the country. This then impacts the transparency of the government and how other countries' are able to judge its intentions.

Building a community is also possible for states that do not have a natural connection, via mutual ties and connections or formal association. Communities are not dependent on the members living in geographic proximity to each other. Australia-United States alliance is an example of such a community, where members are thousands of miles apart yet share identities, values and a long history of reciprocity towards each other.¹²⁹ When this idea is turned around, however, we can also see that it points to the fact that geographical proximity does not mean members come to share a community easily. Australia's distance from its geographical neighbors is examined in Higgott and Nossal's work and is part of the analysis of this dissertation.

Since the end of the cold war, links between economy and security have increased. More security agreements are framed in a way as to support new financial cooperation and more economic integration promoted as providing security.¹³⁰ There is a spill-over effect regarding trust that can enable the birth of a security community: cooperation in one area, such as economy, can spread to security affairs.¹³¹ Security and economy are increasingly tied together and states must consider economic security in addition to traditional threats.

The concept of security communities has a normative aspect, as the assumption is that cooperation between states will lead to a stable peace within the community and that even a world community is possible: *"If the entire world were integrated as a security community,*

¹²⁸ Ibid, 123-129.

¹²⁹ Adler and Barnett 1998, 33.

¹³⁰ Adler and Barnett 1998, 418.

¹³¹ Ibid, 417.

wars would be automatically eliminated".¹³² This is not far from the Kantian notion of democratic peace and security communities are mostly seen to exist between developed, democratic states. Theory of security communities suggests that democracies can easily become an "imagined region" and thus form a security community despite geographical distance. However, as Amitav Acharya has pointed out, the concept of security communities should not be limited for analyzing the politics of democratic, developed countries but can be a useful tool in reviewing the politics of Southeast Asia, for example, where there exists a mix of political systems between states.¹³³

3.4. Framework for studying security communities

Adler and Barnett develop a framework based on Deutch's theory. Their goal was to "*better identify the conditions under which security communities are likely to emerge; focusing on the relationship between transnational forces and interactions, state power, and security politics in ways that depart the traditional realist readings of security politics*".¹³⁴ Emergence of a security community is presented in three steps (tiers) and they will be introduced next. Three tiers are helpful in examining how the cooperation between states develops. First tier examines the conditions that trigger the cooperation. The second tier looks at the relationship between the structure of the region (material power and knowledge) and social processes (organizations, transactions, social learning). The third tier includes mutual trust and the formation of collective identity.¹³⁵

First tier (precipitating conditions) involves those events that trigger the cooperation, such as: 1) change in technology, demography, economics or the environment, 2) development of new interpretations of social reality and/or 3) external threats. Tier two includes the "*factors conducive to the development of mutual trust and collective identity*". This has two aspects, structure (including power and knowledge) and process (including transactions, organizations and social learning). Tier three includes the "*necessary conditions of dependable expectations of peaceful change*", including mutual trust and collective identity.¹³⁶ The expectation is that after these three "levels", states have stepped over the obstacles that usually prevent cooperation – such as lack of trust – and have begun to identify with each other enough to believe that

¹³² Deutch et al 1957, 2.

¹³³ Adler and Barnett 1998, 33; See Acharya, 1998.

¹³⁴ Ibid, 6.

¹³⁵ Adler and Barnett, 38.

¹³⁶ Ibid.

violence is no longer an option in the relations between the states. Thus expectations of peace come to exist.

At the first tier, states start initial coordination with each other due to external or internal reasons. Motives that trigger states to coordinate their policies can be an external threat, new understanding of the social reality, changes in economic, demographic or migration patterns or other developments. At the beginning, this cooperation is still very artificial, not yet providing base for trust or mutual identification but rather providing the opportunities for it. It is good to note that security communities can emerge from different origins, so there is no one explanation for the early conditions.¹³⁷ At the next phase, the cooperation between states and their citizens begin to transform the shared environment. This level is divided between *structural* and *process* categories. The structure involves power and knowledge and process involves categories of transactions, international organizations and institutions, and social learning. It is the connections between the structural and process categories that are seen to provide the opportunities for change in order to form a collective identity and mutual trust, in other words a security community.¹³⁸

The structural categories include power and knowledge. Power can greatly affect the way security communities come to exist: powerful states act as magnets that smaller states are drawn to. They have the power to define the core values and practices for the community and also maintain the collective stance. Powerful actors do not create the security but rather security communities are built around them. Knowledge is the other part of international structure and here it includes cognitive structures, shared meanings and understandings. States are constrained and constituted partly by knowledge of action and legitimacy. Adler and Barnett's theory focuses on those cognitive structures that involve the creation of mutual trust and identity. Trust is an essential concept regarding the build of a security community, and it is not something that comes to existence quickly, but rather something that is developed over time and through years of cooperation, trial and error. Trusting someone always includes the element of risk, since there is no way of knowing their motivations or monitoring the other party. The essence of a security community is that trust that conflicts will be settled without violence and is the highest form of trust in international relations.¹³⁹

¹³⁷ Adler and Barnett 1998, 38-39.

¹³⁸ Ibid, 39.

¹³⁹ Adler and Barnett 1998, 39-40, 414.

The process categories of tier two involve transactions, international organizations and social learning. Transactions include different exchanges, which can be symbolic or material, and represent how dynamic the relationship is. Various, diverse transactions can reshape the collective experience of the actors involved.¹⁴⁰

International organizations have direct and indirect ways of contributing to the creation of security communities. Organizations can improve the level of trust by instituting norms and sanctions; they enable state action through learning and socialization; and they can promote shared culture and goals. Social learning, third concept of the process category, is defined as an “*active process of redefinition or reinterpretation of reality on the basis of new causal and normative knowledge*”. It shows that “*social actors are capable to manage and even transform reality by changing their beliefs of the material and social world and their identities*”.¹⁴¹ Thus learning is not only a technical process but has a social aspect, as the identities of the actors can change and mutual trust is created.

In Australia, the process of learning enabled decision makers and practitioners to redefine the concept of security, moving from traditional security threats to a wider understanding of security that entails economic issues as well. It also helped Australia to view itself as a part of Asia.¹⁴² Thus learning and trust can have a profound effect on the way states view their security environment and position. Material constraints (such as geography and material power) in themselves do limit states ability to act, but they do not dictate state’s position. Australia’s geographic position has not changed over years yet learning and cooperation with neighbors has enabled it to see the security environment differently.

At tier three, conditions for peaceful change come to exist. The necessary conditions for the expectations of peaceful change to take place are *mutual trust* and *collective identity*. Trust comes before identity, as a minimum level of trust is required for the development of a shared identity. Usually organizations are created for the very purpose of monitoring each other and maintaining trust, but in a security community, states have moved beyond that. Trust is a result of knowledge and beliefs about the other. Identity is formed in relation to other people and

¹⁴⁰ Ibid, 41.

¹⁴¹ Ibid 1998, 44.

¹⁴² Adler and Barnett 1998, 422-423.

states; and collective identity means that people identify themselves as a group in relation to other groups.¹⁴³

3.5. Three phases of Security Community and path-dependence

Adler et al. offer a “conceptualization of the mechanisms and conditions by which security communities develop to provide the basis for further research”. Security communities are socially constructed which means that they have a particular history and they evolve in phases (birth, growth, maturity). They argue that the development of a security community is a path-dependent process, which means that the choices made in the beginning of the process come to persist, as individuals and groups begin to identify and benefit from the past decisions and because the cost of change becomes higher over time.¹⁴⁴

The development of the communities is divided into three phases: Nascent, Ascendant and Mature. **Nascent phase** is connected to tier one, explained earlier, as it includes the conditions that trigger the cooperation initially. Triggers are likely to have both material and normative bases and they can be for example a common security threat; changes in distribution of military power; events that change the material structures and mindsets; or transnational processes that create common interests. As interaction between states and peoples increases, organizations are created to facilitate trust. The creation of multilateral security organizations is especially important, as they reflect the view that security is interdependent. At this level, powerful states can push the cooperation further and maintain stability by providing a vision for the future and protection for other members.¹⁴⁵ *At the second (ascendant) phase*, cooperation has become dense, new institutions for tighter military cooperation have been created and cognitive structures which enable actors to see and act together are beginning to come to exist. Mutual trust becomes deeper and thus opens the possibility for dependable expectations of peaceful change. Level of trust can be measured by reviewing military cooperation; states begin to share intelligence information and make decisions that show a mutual military posture as a sign of trust. At the same time, organizations originally in place for monitoring and assurance become less important. Mutual trust is driven by social learning and knowledge of each other's intentions and interpretations of society and politics. As the interpretations become shared

¹⁴³ Ibid, 47-48.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid, 49.

¹⁴⁵ Adler and Barnett 1998, 52-53.

between nations, a collective culture can be seen to exist and can be detected by analyzing narratives that they share.¹⁴⁶ At the *mature phase*, a security community has come to existence and actors come to share an identity. Evidence of the security community is found in a shared identity and culture; low or no probability of conflicts leading to military action and the differentiation between those on the inside and outside of the community. The right to use force is reserved for actors on the “outside” and in a tight community, mutual aid becomes a habit. Important here is the discourse within the community which reflects the community’s standards and norms against those of the actors outside the community.¹⁴⁷ This three phase process, together with the three tiers explained earlier, offer the analytical tools for analyzing security communities and how they come to exist.

3.6. Criticism towards the theory

As previously mentioned, the creation of a security community means that a region comes to have dependable expectations of peaceful change.¹⁴⁸ Wiberg argues that Adler and Barnett should show in more detail what the conditions that promote “*dynamic density*” and social interaction between peoples and states are. He notes that in the case of Scandinavia, language and religion were more important than political and economic factors in encouraging communication and immigration between countries. He notes that “power” and authority did not have a significant role in the formation of a Scandinavian security community. Adler and Barnett respond that their point was to show that security communities are formed due to complex historical processes and one should not get hang up on a single determinant such as that of “core strength”.¹⁴⁹ They also note that the role of power should be more carefully analyzed. The nature of power relationships changes during the creation of a security community as the source of power comes from ideational contest and authority claims, not from deterrence and physical force.¹⁵⁰

¹⁴⁶ Ibid, 53-54.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid, 55-56.

¹⁴⁸ Adler and Barnett 2000, 321.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid 2000, 232, 323.

¹⁵⁰ Adler and Barnett 1998, 345.

Bially argues that the connection between identity and security is not clear enough and should be made more vigorous.¹⁵¹ There is not a straight causal relationship between identity and the formation of a security community. At most, shared identity makes it possible or desirable to create new forms of institutionalized arrangements and therefor shared identity is *not a necessary nor a sufficient* condition at the early stages of development. Shared identity is defined as a “*collective meaning that becomes attached to material reality, thus helping to constitute the practices of security community at a later stage*”. Shared identities are also learned by actors who have a causal role in the building of the security community’s practices.¹⁵² As mentioned earlier the only necessary conditions for pluralistic communities are compatibility of major values and mutual responsiveness and there wasn’t a very strict criteria regarding values. Many values can be left out of the political process, in other words depoliticized.

Gonzalez and Haggard argue that contrary to Deutch and his colleagues claim, increased transactions and interdependence between nations do not always drive countries to cooperate more closely. They point out that in the case of Mexico and United States, trade and other connections did not provide basis for a community. Rather, it was dependent on Mexico adjusting to the interests of the United States, due to the large unbalance in the power relationship of the countries. In an unbalanced relationship, threats to security are not usually the traditional military kinds, but rather non-traditional threats related to immigration, environment or drugs.¹⁵³ Building a security community between countries with a significant difference in power status requires even more trust than usual. Adler and Barnett argue that security communities are built around cores of strength and the core power pulls others into cooperation. Differences in levels of power, however, do not always work in the same way. Asymmetric power relationships seem to only work when the more and less powerful actors share cultural values.¹⁵⁴ An unbalanced power relationship thus becomes a larger issue when states do not share the same values, and as noted by the earlier chapters, according to the theory states should be able to escape this problem by increased cooperation and interactions. However, as Guadalupe and Haggard argue, interaction alone is not always the solution and weaker states must usually make adjustments in the relationship.

¹⁵¹ Adler and Barnett 2000, 323.

¹⁵² Ibid, 324.

¹⁵³ Gonzalez and Haggard 1998, 317, 325.

¹⁵⁴ Adler and Barnett 1998, 424.

One can argue then, that Deutch and his colleagues overestimated the value of interaction in building a security community. This issue largely arises because their research topic was the North Atlantic Community and largely democratic countries. Thus they could possibly overemphasize the positive effect that interaction can have in the process. In the analysis, I will consider this question in relation to Australia's relationship with China, as there is a clear unbalance of power in the relationship, yet the two countries have increased their interaction through trade, migration and study exchanges over recent years. It is also the official policy of Australia to increase interaction between the countries and build trust through this process.

3.7. Conclusions

Theory of security communities resurfaced after the Cold War, when research programs focusing on identities, norms and social basis of the international politics began popular again. The theory assumes that international actors are able to share norms and identities in order to coexist in peaceful ways. In addition, the theory expects states to exist in an environment that is both social and material, allowing us to view security policy in a wider framework. Adler and Barnett present a three phase model of how states become integrated. First, states initiate the cooperation due to changes in the environment or internal reasons. Second, structural changes take place as powerful states push the cooperation forward and pull weaker states to join the community. Shared knowledge between the actors shapes the norms and ideas that are the basis for the cooperation. At the process side, organizations are created to facilitate trust between the members and social learning enables actors to begin to trust each other. Thirdly, mutual trust is becoming so strong that external institutions are no longer needed to facilitate the cooperation. States have created a collective identity. Adler et al. further argue that security communities have three stages, nascent, ascendant and mature, each level with their own features. This three level model is not intended to be a strict road map, as the process of integration does not always proceed smoothly but can move back and forward again. In the analysis, these indicators for cooperation are utilized to evaluate, where Australia's security policy is heading to regarding United States and China.

4. Analysis: Australian security policy post-2008

4.1. Research design and method

This dissertation is a theory oriented single case study, utilizing qualitative research design. In qualitative research, the aim is to describe and understand a phenomena.¹⁵⁵ It is often referred to as “understanding” rather than “explaining”.¹⁵⁶ Wendt argues, however, that one should not draw a strict line between these ways of research, since regarding international relations, one must be able to both explain events and understand their background.¹⁵⁷ This dissertation aims to understand Australia’s foreign policy decisions and explain the context and background of the choices.

The case analyzed here is Australian security policy in 2009-2015 with United States and China. Case study method was selected as it gives a good opportunity to apply existing theoretical framework to a real life policy question. Previous academic research on the issue is utilized and thus some comparisons can be made. However, it must be noted that this study is not strictly comparable to the work of Higgott and Nossal’s and differences in the method and research questions exist. The focus of the study is on elite opinion and official policy documents and statements by political leaders are analyzed by utilizing the theory framework of security communities and by reflecting on existing literature. I acknowledge that security policy documents are created for a political purpose and thus do not always reflect the actual state of affairs. One must consider archives to be instances of “purposeful communication” and consider what purpose the document was written for. In order to understand the surroundings and atmosphere of the case, the environment surrounding the policy makers at the time, one should turn to news, which also helps one to notice what the public’s perception was on the issue.¹⁵⁸ This study will analyze both official documents, speeches and news regarding the case and special attention will be paid to the analysis of the surroundings and purpose of each document.¹⁵⁹ The content analyzed here is naturally occurring data. Those whose statements are under analysis have not been interviewed nor are they aware of the study or the collection

¹⁵⁵ Tuomi & Sarajärvi 2009, 20-21, 85, 103-104.

¹⁵⁶ Ibid, 28.

¹⁵⁷ Wendt 1999, 85.

¹⁵⁸ George and Bennett 2005, 107-108.

¹⁵⁹ More statements from Prime minister Tony Abbott than other Prime ministers of Australia have been included, in order to analyze the current direction, since his government has not yet published a Defence White Paper.

of the source material.¹⁶⁰ All the source material for the dissertation is readily available on the internet. Content analysis is a method that assisted in organizing the source material in a focused and objective way. Theory guides this process and is essential in reflecting on the results.¹⁶¹

In a case study, a researcher asks general questions regarding a case and these questions guide and standardize the data collection, in order to make systematic comparisons and to cumulate the findings of the cases. Only certain aspects of the historical case are examined, to allow the method to be focused. Firstly one must recognize the subset of events and what problem(s) she is interested in and then choose the case(s) accordingly. The focus of this dissertation is in security alliances and more broadly, security communities, of which the Australia-United States alliance is an example of. Case selection and analysis should be guided by a well-defined research objective and strategy, in order to ensure the case(s) is not chosen only out of interest or because enough data exists.¹⁶² Australia-United States cooperation was selected for a case study here in order to continue previous academic work on the subject. It is also a good example of a security community defined by Deutch, where two countries have surpassed the security dilemma in international relations and issues are expected to be resolved peacefully.

Case studies can be conducted in numerous ways. They can have implications for theory testing or theory development. Using a plausibility probe or a study of deviant cases one can find for example new or left out variables, hypotheses, causal paths or causal mechanisms and thus develop the theory. Theory testing is a way to strengthen or reduce the support for a theory; to extend or narrow the scope conditions of a theory; or to determine which of two or more theories best explain a case. Case studies can have an impact on theory testing or development on three different levels. First, they can establish, weaken or strengthen a historical explanation for a case. Second, a finding that a theory does or doesn't explain a case can be generalized to the type of similar cases (ie. the class of cases such as alliances). Thirdly, and most broadly, case studies can sometimes be generalized to all cases of a phenomenon, although over-generalization can be a risk. This is why most case researchers use only narrow, well-specified generalizations about a type. The method applied in this dissertation is closest to process tracing at a general level. The purpose is to construct a general explanation instead of a "detailed tracing of causal process" and to move to a higher level of abstraction.¹⁶³ As a research objective, the

¹⁶⁰ Alasuutari 2011, 84.

¹⁶¹ Tuomi & Sarajärvi 2009, 103.

¹⁶² Bennett & George 2005, 68-69.

¹⁶³ Ibid 2005, 211.

aim is to understand the general direction of Australia's foreign policy and not detailed decisions. When working on a case study, one has to formulate the *objectives*, *design* and *structure* of the research. Then each case study is completed according to the design. Lastly the findings from the case studies are analyzed in relation to the research agenda. However, these three phases of study are interdependent and not clearly separated.¹⁶⁴

This dissertation attempts to answer how and why Australia has developed its foreign and security policy towards United States and China, during a time when China's economic growth has been significant and United States has launched a new foreign policy direction towards Asia-Pacific.

The security policy documents and statements were analyzed by asking following questions: How do Australian policy makers view cooperation with the United States and China? What is the reaction to American rebalancing process? How is China's growth viewed in the documents? What concrete contributions have been made towards cooperation with China and United States? How does Australia view its neighborhood? What threats are depicted in the security policy? From these questions and the theory framework, following areas were selected for focus: threat perception, regional security, U.S security community, nascent community with China and interdependence within the region. In the final part, the results are analyzed in relation to the theory, noting that Australian policy makers have created two images of Asia. Lastly, comments are made on how this dissertation adds to the study of security communities and what options there are for further study.

The source material, Defence White Papers, are Australia's principal public guidelines regarding security policy. In 2009, Defence White Papers were decided to be published every five years. White Papers reflect the long term planning of Australia's defence and security policy and usually result from a long policy process. One should note, however, that White Papers are political documents and produced with a certain goal in mind. They might promise too much and aim too high, as goals can often be forgotten at the change of a government. 2012 White Paper by Gillard government, for example, has been criticized as too ambitious and lacking concrete policy goals.¹⁶⁵ This is the case in analyzing any political documents. Even when they lack concrete steps in how to achieve policy goals, White Papers are good sources

¹⁶⁴ Ibid, 73.

¹⁶⁵ See Jennings, 2012 and Beeson, 2013.

for the general direction Australia's security policy is going and how the country relates to its neighbors and what it envisions as possible threats.

As Bennett and George advice, official policy documents should be considered as *purposeful communication*. In the analysis, one must consider what purpose they were written for. News provide background on what the public's perception was on the issue.¹⁶⁶ Understanding the public's view is not a goal for this study, as the focus is on *elite* opinion, but news and surrounding events will be considered throughout the analysis in order to provide context for the security policy. In addition, in order to understand Australia's policy making, I also consider what is not said in the documents.

When Defence White Paper 2000¹⁶⁷ was published, the Australian government was focused on reviewing the role and capabilities of the defence forces. They argued that with the current budget, Australian Defence Force (ADF) could not keep up with its duties and the White Paper was conducted to prioritize the tasks for it. At the time, top priority was given to maintaining armed forces that are capable of protecting Australia from an armed attack. It was also acknowledged that conventional military threats remain a part of the international system.¹⁶⁸ In 2009, a decade after the previous White Paper, a new Defence White Paper was published under the Labor government of Kevin Rudd and Minister of Defence Joel Fitzgibbon. White Paper 2009 considers Australia's strategic policy until 2030. It continues the official policy of self-reliance in the direct defence of Australia and its interests. Help from the United States is only expected when threatened by a major power with military capabilities beyond Australia's abilities. Alliance also brings Australia advantages in military and intelligence capabilities and the U.S nuclear deterrence.¹⁶⁹ Defence White Paper 2013 was conducted under the Labor government of Prime Minister Gillard. White paper was scheduled to be published in 2014 (on a five year schedule) but was conducted a year earlier due to the changes in the region and the negative effects that the financial crises was seen to have on strategic stability in the region. White Paper notes as a starting point that the most important factor determining Australia's strategic position in the future is the relationship between the United States and China. In addition, changes in the region are considered important, as many countries in addition to China

¹⁶⁶ Bennett and George 2005, 107-108.

¹⁶⁷ It was the fourth White Paper since 1976 and the previous was published in 1994.

¹⁶⁸ Commonwealth of Australia, Department of Defence 2000, 6.

¹⁶⁹ Commonwealth of Australia, Department of Defence 2009, 50.

are enhancing their military capabilities. White Paper continues the policy of self-reliance but also gives strong support for the enhanced presence of the United States in the region.¹⁷⁰

In addition to White Papers, Australia's National Security Strategy is analyzed. Prime Minister Gillard commissioned Australia's first National Security Strategy (NSS) in 2013 in order to "*ensure Australia remains strong and secure in the Asian Century*". The document defines security objectives and how to reach them. The purpose for having a public security strategy is to communicate to both Australian citizens and the country's allies how they view their security environment and how will they respond to main challenges regarding national security.¹⁷¹ In sum, the document should analyze the main factors affecting Australia's strategic position and security and how it will manages these challenges and threats. The NSS, as White Papers 2009 and 2013, begins by pointing out that the strategic focus will be in Asia-Pacific region in the coming decades and thus speaks of "*Asian Century*" and "*period of change*".¹⁷² The undertone is that the strategic weight that is given to the region has to be managed by the Australian government or it will suffer from the coming developments.

Furthermore, "Australia in the Asian Century White Paper" published in 2012, was selected as a source as it gives an overall picture of how Australia aims to navigate its way in the "Asian Century". Conducted under the Gillard government, it "*sets out what actions can be taken by Australian governments, businesses and communities in order for Australia to become a more Asia-literate and Asia-capable nation*". In addition to security, the document considers trade, culture, research and other links Australia has with the region.¹⁷³

4.2. Threat perception

As explained in the previous chapters, Australian security policy has been dominated by realist thinking and fear of invasion. Higgott and Nossal argue that Australians perceived themselves as removed from the cultural home of Britain and situated next to countries unlike itself: poor, undeveloped and undemocratic. The neighborhood was thus seen traditionally as a threat, to Australia's racial purity or national interests. This fear of the region manifested itself in many ways, on the one hand in attempts to keep Australia racially "pure" with immigration laws and

¹⁷⁰ Commonwealth of Australia, Department of Defence 2013, 2, 9, 26, 28.

¹⁷¹ Gillard 2013.

¹⁷² Ibid.

¹⁷³ Australian Embassy, 2012.

on the other hand, by seeking Western alliance in security first from the United Kingdom and later, from the United States.¹⁷⁴ In this chapter, the threat perception in security policy is reviewed in reference to Higgott and Nossal's view. Have images of threat remained same and how does the alliance contribute to them?¹⁷⁵

The main focus of Australian security strategy is on protecting Australian continent from conventional threats with the help of alliances. As an isolated country, Australia has always tended to seek security through alliances. Successive Australian governments have also held a very state-centric approach to security. Aware of its middle power status and limited ability to influence the world, Australia has nevertheless aimed at maintaining a high-level of diplomatic engagement in global issues, in effort to enhance the rules based liberal order in the world.¹⁷⁶

Threats have two roles in security communities: they can initiate the original cooperation and once the community is formed, states tend to share images of threat as the use of violence is only legitimate to those outside the community. In the tier one (or nascent phase) of the process of creating a security community something triggers the cooperation between states. The trigger could be a change in technology, demography, economics or the environment; a development of new interpretations of social reality; and/or external threats. In the case of Australia, an external threat and changes in the region pushed the country to seek a military alliance with the United States. After feeling that United Kingdom could no longer successfully defend Australia from the aggression of Japan or communist expansion, Australia turned to the United States to gain security guarantees. External threat alone does not sustain a security alliance, and since the Cold War, Australia-United States community has been built around values, trade and other connections. Yet shared perception of threats are a prominent feature of the community and have a significant role in Australia's security policy.

Security policy documents do not step away from the traditional focus on conventional threats and military alliance as a way of confirming security. The most basic interest for Australia's defence policy is still deemed to be the defence of the Australian continent from an armed attack by other states or non-state actors, including attacks by weapons of mass destruction. ADF must be capable to deter and defeat armed attacks on Australia and control the sea and air approaches

¹⁷⁴ Higgott and Nossal 1998, 267-269.

¹⁷⁵ The role of China is considered in the chapter 4.5. and thus concerns regarding China's expansions are analyzed there.

¹⁷⁶ O'Neil 2011, 19-20.

without relying on other countries for combat support. Secondary strategic interest is the security and stability of the immediate region, shared with Indonesia, Papua New Guinea, East Timor, New Zealand and the South Pacific island states. It is seen as a crucial interest for Australia that these countries do not pose a direct risk to its interest and that no hostile country will use them as a base from which to project force against Australia. The biggest risk is seen to be a failed state in the proximity of Australia. White Paper 2009 notes that while Indonesia has taken steps towards multiparty democracy and worked as a partner in counterterrorism, it also states that *“a weak, fragmented Indonesia beset by intractable communal problems, poverty and failing state institutions, would potentially be a source of threat to our own security and to Indonesia's other neighbours (...).The evolution of democracy gives Indonesia a sound foundation for long-term stability and prosperity, and positive relationships with its neighbours. This is in keeping with Australia's strategic interests. ”*.¹⁷⁷ White Paper 2013 places even more importance on the country and declares Indonesia Australia's most important strategic partnership in the region.¹⁷⁸ Australia is a Western country neighboring non-democratic countries and this can lead to focusing on military means and alliances in providing for security. Australia's security policy focuses on making sure that the immediate region is secure and that it's neighboring countries will not pose a direct risk to its interests.

Since the White Paper 2013, developments in the Indonesia-Australia relationship have taken place. Two Australian citizens were executed by the Indonesian government in 2015 due to drug trafficking charges. Australia withdrew its Indonesian ambassador as a response. Foreign minister Julie Bishop stated regarding the death penalties that: *“I want to stress that this is a very important relationship between Australia and Indonesia, but it has suffered as a result of what's been done over the last few hours.”*¹⁷⁹ The impact that the so called “Bali nine” executions will have on Australia's relationship with Indonesia remains to be seen in the future. However, these events show how difficult it is for Australia to manage relations with countries in the region that do not share the same norms and judicial systems. It also could confirm again for Australians how different they are from their neighbors. Yet Indonesia is so important to Australia's own security that it is unlikely the executions will become a serious strain on the relationship.

¹⁷⁷ Commonwealth of Australia, Department of Defence 2009 10-13, 35, 49.

¹⁷⁸ Commonwealth of Australia, Department of the Prime Minister and the Cabinet 2013, 11.

¹⁷⁹ Bishop 29.4.2015.

As White Paper 2009 analyzes Australia's position from 2009 till the 2030's, it assumes Australia will most likely remain safe during this time, due to its geostrategic location. It is a country far away from traditional areas of conflict between major states and there are no serious indicators for conflict between its neighbors. Australia's safety in the recent decades is explained by the peace and stability that has been enjoyed in the wider Asia-Pacific region, guaranteed by the U.S primacy. It is perceived that this strategic situation is altered by the redistribution of economic and strategic power, and competition could escalate unexpectedly. The White Paper reaffirms Australia's support for the continued presence of United States through alliances and American military capabilities situated in the region.¹⁸⁰

Terrorism does not appear as a threat image in Higgott and Nossal's analysis, as it largely arrived on Australian agenda after the 2001 and the 9/11 and 2002 Bali terrorist attacks. Since then, fear of terrorist attack on Australian soil has been a significant part of Australian defence policy.¹⁸¹ It participated actively in the war against terrorism with its ally, United States. Terrorism and national security continue to be focus points in the policy planning also after the Howard government. Terrorist attack affecting Australia's interests or threatening Australians is seen as a "*concern for the foreseeable future*". White Paper notes that in case of a mass casualty attack in European or American soil, Australia would have to consider sending military support to a coalition against the "*geographical source of the attack*", as happened after 9/11.

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Since the attacks of 9/11 and the Bali bombing in 2002, where 88 Australians were killed, Australian government has increased spending on counter-terrorism measures. Intelligence and law enforcement capabilities have been expanded, new anti-terrorism laws introduced and national security spending increased. Combined budget for national intelligence more than tripled between 2000 and 2012.¹⁸³ This trend continues in 2015 as announced by Prime Minister Abbott, calling for extended rights and capabilities for authorities in fighting terrorism. Abbott's government raised the national threat level for terrorism to high in 2013 and Abbott notes that the threat of terrorism to Australia is "worsening by any measure".¹⁸⁴ These changes reflect a significant change into a harder approach to terrorism and homeland security. Key

¹⁸⁰ Commonwealth of Australia, Department of Defence 2009, 49.

¹⁸¹ O'Neill 2011, 28.

¹⁸² Commonwealth of Australia, Department of Defence 2009, 35-38.

¹⁸³ Commonwealth of Australia, Department of the Prime Minister and the Cabinet 2013, vi, 9.

¹⁸⁴ Abbott 23.2.2015.

allies regarding intelligence sharing for Australia are the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada and New Zealand.¹⁸⁵ Effective border control is seen as a crucial part of the counter-terrorism policy. Australia focuses on preventing people with criminal or terrorist intent from entering or leaving Australia by placing the on controls beyond the borders. Australian border management agencies devote “*far greater effort*” beyond their shores to prevent terrorist from reaching the country.

”Australian agencies are working cooperatively to push border clearance processes back as far as possible to the point of origin. This means that checking and screening commences well before people, cargo, vessels and aircraft cross Australia’s physical border. This approach strengthens Australia’s border and limits interruptions to legitimate travel and trade.”¹⁸⁶

These policies will not necessarily attract a good response from the regional countries. Australia’s policies regarding asylum seekers, for example, have been under international scrutiny and placed a serious strain on Australia’s reputation.¹⁸⁷ Considering the heavy emphasis that Australia places on the United Nations’ role in the region, regarding managing the regional disputes, for example, these policies have a serious change to undermine its efforts and authority in other areas. Australia’s tough stance on asylum seekers, increased national security spending and enhanced anti-terrorism laws raise questions over human rights and international law. Taken together they show that Australia has come to prioritize traditional security in its policy over other forms of security, such as human security and impacts of climate change. Making the immigration process more selective and pushing border checks to the point of origin do not work as a way of increasing links with the region but could rather reaffirm the view of Australia as seeking to exclude non-Western immigration as it did until the 1970’s.

Higgott and Nossal note that although in the 1940’s to 1970’s Australian security policy concerned mainly the fear of invasion, in the 1980’s new threats emerged and the concept of security began to include aspects such as economic security.¹⁸⁸ Today, Australian security policy considers political and economic power as possible sources of threats as well. Threat from the region is not necessarily a threat of intervention or a traditional attack and political

¹⁸⁵ Commonwealth of Australia, Department of the Prime Minister and the Cabinet 2010, 28-29.

¹⁸⁶ Commonwealth of Australia, Department of the Prime Minister and the Cabinet 2013, 37-39.

¹⁸⁷ Human rights law centre, 9.3.2015.

¹⁸⁸ Higgott and Nossal 1998, 274

pressure is seen as a risk: *“A more likely challenge to our interests than armed conflict is the risk of another state seeking to influence Australia or its regional and global partners by economic, political or military pressure.”*¹⁸⁹ As Australia forms closer ties with Asian nations, they could *“seek to exercise influence over our national decision making and use of our resources”*.¹⁹⁰ Consequently, while Australia eagerly emphasizes the opportunities of regional cooperation, it is wary of the side effects of this process. In asymmetrical power relationships security threats are often something else than traditional military threats – they could be related to environment, illicit drugs or illegal immigration. Usually the weaker party has to control these factors in the partnership, by for example controlling illegal immigration.¹⁹¹ In the case of Australia, it is the militarily stronger and economically more developed party in relation to many Asian countries. In relation to China, however, the relationship is clearly asymmetrical in China’s favor regarding military and economic power. Usually differences in power relationship can be overcome if both parties share the same value system and clearly this is another obstacle for Australia’s partnership with China. On the other hand, Australia aims to control illegal immigration to its own shores and not vice versa in relation to its partners. In many ways, Australia takes a higher moral standing in global issues in relation to its neighbors, for example in encouraging the use of international law in territorial disputes and encouraging China to join the rules based order Australia promotes. Yet in order for the relationship to become a closer one, it is usually the weaker partner that has to adjust its expectations to match the stronger partner, as in the case of Mexico and the United States. In the relationship with China, then, it is likely that Australia will have to make adjustments. These issues will be explored further in the following chapter.

Australia’s realist assumptions of the world and focus on traditional threats are evident in the security policy since 2008. Policy documents also show that security policy is still very much state-centric, although some non-state actors such as terrorist groups and illegal immigrants are also considered. The most fundamental task for the ADF is still to protect Australia from an attack that would most likely occur from the region. Instability in the immediate region, including countries such as Indonesia and Papua New Guinea, are also seen as a threat that Australia must prepare for. The continued emphasis on counter-terrorism measures shows that the foreign policy direction has continued to emphasize the same images of threat that were

¹⁸⁹ Commonwealth of Australia, Department of Defence 2013, 11.

¹⁹⁰ Commonwealth of Australia, Department of the Prime Minister and the Cabinet 2013, 28; Commonwealth of Australia 2012, 227.

¹⁹¹ Gonzalez and Haggard 1998, 317.

largely adopted during the Howard government from the United States. Protecting Australia from terrorist groups, illegal movement of people and other non-state actors is seen as a priority for the border controls. In extending the border controls far away to the origins however, Australia might risk once again depicting the neighborhood that it claims to want to embrace, as a threat to its interests.

4.3. Regional security

“Australians may have an approach to international politics that is distinct from the “American way”, but Australian diplomacy remains essentially Westphalian, its foreign policy essentially Cartesian, and its defence policy essentially Hobbesian.”¹⁹²

Higgott and Nossal argue that as the Labor governments pushed for further security cooperation with the region, they came into conflict with the defence department and the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), which held realist beliefs regarding security policy. Contradiction in Australian foreign policy remained as at the level of rhetoric it called for more cooperation, yet at the level of practical defence policy, continued to protect itself from that very same region.¹⁹³ Security policy since 2008 shows that the same trend continues in Australian security policy, with a renewed (rhetorical) emphasis on the region, based on the rapid economic and military developments taking place.

“A transformational agenda for Australia’s engagement with the region is needed”, notes the White Paper 2012.¹⁹⁴ *“Profound strategic changes”*; *“security challenges of the 21st century”*; and *“significant opportunities and challenges”* are facing Australia in the coming years, continues White Paper 2013.¹⁹⁵ The region around Australia is changing: as China’s and other nations’ economies grow with a fast pace, they are also modernizing military forces and their ability for power projection. United States’ hegemonic position is increasingly challenged and at the same time, Australia’s relative strategic weight in the region is changing. These

¹⁹² Higgott and Nossal, 1998, 282.

¹⁹³ Ibid, 275-276.

¹⁹⁴ Commonwealth of Australia 2012, 252.

¹⁹⁵ Commonwealth of Australia, Department of Defence 2013, 1, 13.

developments are transforming the strategic order in the region. As a consequence, Australia has to rethink its national defence and security policy.¹⁹⁶

This is the official view of Australia's policy makers. The starting point of all the security policy post-2008 is that the regional order is profoundly changing and Australia must adapt and make the most of the opportunities while preparing for potential tensions and conflict. Economic growth will increase pressure on natural resources such as water and energy supplies and the existing strategic order will change as countries, especially China and India, increase their military budgets and improve their power projection capabilities, while the opposite trend occurs in Western countries.¹⁹⁷ Global financial crises has hit the Western countries especially hard and as a result the strategic weight of the Asia-Pacific region is growing. As Western countries, including the U.S, are decreasing their military expenses, China's defence spending grew by 140 percent in real terms between 2000 and 2013 and other Asian countries such as Japan grew their budgets. However, U.S still has largest share (41 percent in 2011) of the world's defence spending. Australia remains in the top 15 spenders in defence, which is seen to be consistent with its size and reach. Due to the growing abilities of other Asian nations, it is assessed that Australia's relative strategic weight will be tested in the coming decades but that it will maintain the ability for effective self-defence.¹⁹⁸

Australia aims to maintain "*the capacity for effective self-defence and for an active regional posture*".¹⁹⁹ Regional influence is weighed in military terms. "*The more Australia aspires to have greater strategic influence beyond our immediate neighbourhood - that is to say the ability to exert policy influence that is underpinned by military power - the greater the level of spending on defence we need to be prepared to undertake.*"²⁰⁰ It is assessed that Australia will have more difficulties in achieving political outcomes as the environment becomes increasingly complex and Asian countries will have diverse interests and partners. Thus Australia is required to be "*clearer and stronger*" in order to be acknowledged and Australian political influence has to be buttressed by a credible defence force.²⁰¹ Developments in the region are seen as a reason

¹⁹⁶ Commonwealth of Australia 2012, 7; Commonwealth of Australia, Department of Defence 2009, 33; Commonwealth of Australia, Department of Defence 2013, 1, 13; Commonwealth of Australia, Department of the Prime Minister and the Cabinet 2013, 3, 27.

¹⁹⁷ Commonwealth of Australia, Department of the Prime Minister and the Cabinet 2013, vii; Commonwealth of Australia 2012, 7.

¹⁹⁸ Commonwealth of Australia, Department of defence 2013, 9, 15.

¹⁹⁹ Commonwealth of Australia, Department of Defence 2013, 15.

²⁰⁰ Commonwealth of Australia, Department of Defence 2009, 11.

²⁰¹ Commonwealth of Australia, Department of Defence 2013, 8, 26, 60.

for Australia to increase its own military budget and capabilities, in order not to fall behind in its relative strength towards others.

Increasing regional integration and interconnectedness are seen as positive development yet also as a possible threat. While serious conflict is seen to be unlikely due to the connections between nations, at the same time, even small tensions could lead to “*dangerous outcomes*”.²⁰² One of the striking features of the defence planning is that transformation of the existing order is depicted as an inherently dangerous process.²⁰³ While National Security Strategy 2013 argues that strategic changes are manageable and Australia will benefit from the economic opportunities from the region, the document still highlights the risks that these changes will bring, not unlike the other policy documents analyzed here. Multilateral, rules-based cooperation is seen as the way to manage this regional competition, yet Australia’s own capabilities are a source of concern. United Nations (UN) is given a lot of emphasis and Australia supports the idea of including Japan, India and Brazil as permanent members of the Security Council. Australia also advocates for the implementation of the UN Convention of the Law of the Sea.²⁰⁴ The region’s relatively peaceful state for the past decades has been favorable to Australia’s interests, enabling a steady economic growth as well. The ability of some countries to grow rapidly is viewed as destabilizing effect to this status quo and as a possible cause for increased competition and tension.

The changes in the environment are seen as so fundamental as to provide a reason to conceptualize the region in a new way. As the Defence White Paper 2009 is concerned of Asia-Pacific as a region, in 2013 a new geostrategic concept, Indo-Pacific, is introduced:

“China’s continued rise as a global power, the increasing economic and strategic weight of East Asia and the emergence over time of India as a global power are key trends influencing the Indian Ocean’s development as an area of increasing strategic significance. In aggregate, these trends are shaping the emergence of the Indo-Pacific as a single strategic arc.”²⁰⁵

“The term ‘Indo-Pacific’ has emerged more recently. It captures the region spanning the Indian Ocean through to the western Pacific Ocean. ‘Indo-Pacific’ emphasises the growing significance of this geographic corridor and

²⁰² Commonwealth of Australia, Department of the Prime Minister and the Cabinet 2013, vii.

²⁰³ Commonwealth of Australia 2012, 7.

²⁰⁴ Commonwealth of Australia 2012, 228, 233-234.

²⁰⁵ Commonwealth of Australia, Department of Defence 2013, 2.

of India, with Australia increasingly considering its interests through this lens, as well as the Asia-Pacific.”²⁰⁶

Regions and communities are not based on geographical facts but rather *ideas* of a region.²⁰⁷ In constructing a new *idea* of a region, the Indo-Pacific, Australia is able to consider its interests through this. This points to the fact that Australian policy makers largely view Asia from the point of view of their own national interests and rarely do they reflect on the internal features that make this region unique. Even in picturing the “Indo-Pacific”, Australians are creating a simple label for a complex region, onto which project their own worries and hopes.

The passages describing Australia’s intentions for community building with its neighbors follow this same logic, comparing Asia to Europe and defining it as something separate from Australia. Regional security community is pictured as underdeveloped and lacking the institutional framework such as found in Europe. Asia’s diversity and “*different history*” mean that a lack of a collective security should be no surprise and that the security framework will develop at “*its own pace and with its own characteristics*”.²⁰⁸ Australia has been eager to support Association of South East Asian Nations’ (ASEAN) contribution in the region and is now advocating the work of ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting-Plus (ADMM+) in building confidence and stability between different nations. It calls for a security community encompassing for example Japan, China and India.²⁰⁹ However, the rhetoric clearly separates Australia from the region. Asia’s history and culture are seen as something different and the possibility of building a security community in the region is seen as a difficult task at best. Australia, calling for community, still hopes for an order based on the U.S hegemony, rather than one that could originate from the region itself. Security policy assumes that “order” must be brought from the outside and be based on Western ideas.

4.4. U.S alliance

“The alliance is driven by shared values, a long history and a common set of aspirations for the global system. It has never required us to abandon our independent national interests or policies and there will always be issues on which

²⁰⁶ Commonwealth of Australia, Department of the Prime Minister and the Cabinet 2013, 30.

²⁰⁷ Adler and Barnett 1998, 33.

²⁰⁸ Commonwealth of Australia 2012, 235.

²⁰⁹ Commonwealth of Australia, Department of Defence 2009, 43.

our views diverge. But the alliance embodies trust. It impels us to understand and take into account the views of our partner.”²¹⁰

Higgott and Nossal describe the alliance with the United States as Australia’s “old world of security”. It served as an “*ongoing confirmation of what Adler and Barnett call the “we-ness” of the group members: Australians, New Zealanders, Americans, and Europeans*”. Security arrangement were reflected in the trade links with America and Europe.²¹¹ Today, the cooperation can be seen to have expanded to a “mature stage”. Trade links were made official in the 2005 Free Trade Treaty (AUSFTA), although United States is no longer main partner in trade for Australia. In the realm of security, Australia has taken parts in wars and military cooperation continues. As Higgott and Nossal argue, a security community serves to emphasize the member’s collective identity. It can be argued, then, that by choosing to stay integrated in the “old world of security” Australia has also decided to enhance its identity as “Western”, mainly white and European, excluding other possible directions it could have taken. Connecting itself tightly to this Western community can also work against its other policy goals, such as those laid out in White Paper 2012: integrating with the region and becoming more “Asia-literate”.²¹²

In spite of the fact that all the policy papers analyzed here note that the order of security is changing in the region, Australia is still confident that that the United States will be the most powerful country in Asia for the probable future. Any decline to the strategic U.S presence in the region is expected to impact Australia’s interests and regional stability in a negative way.²¹³ It is acknowledged, however, that United States is increasingly occupied and stretched financially and will seek further cooperation from its allies, such as Australia, in the future both in crises but also in upholding general regional security arrangements. Nevertheless, Australian policy makers expect United States to remain the most influential actor globally over the period in question (till 2030) in political, economic and military terms. Nuclear deterrence is seen as underpinning America’s strategic power.²¹⁴ White paper 2013 predicts that the relationship between U.S and China will become constructive, as both countries will seek cooperation rather

²¹⁰ Commonwealth of Australia 2012, 231.

²¹¹ Higgott and Nossal 1998, 267-269.

²¹² Commonwealth of Australia 2012.

²¹³ Commonwealth of Australia, Department of Defence 2009, 32; Commonwealth of Australia 2012, 7.

²¹⁴ Commonwealth of Australia, Department of Defence 2009, 32-33.

than conflict. Yet some competition is seen as inevitable and a political and strategic relationship should be extended to better match the economic integration.²¹⁵

At the mature stage of a security community, *“regional actors share an identity and, therefore, entertain dependable expectations of peaceful change.”* Australia-U.S community can be described as tightly coupled, where *“mutual aid becomes a matter of habit, and thus, national identity is expressed through the merging of efforts”*. In addition, the right to use force and nuclear deterrence is only relevant against actors *outside* the community.²¹⁶

As parties to a security community, leaders of both countries tend to echo the value of the cooperation and its roots in history and liberal values. Prime Minister Abbott describes the community as having family ties: *“Few nations understand each other so deeply or so well as the United States and Australia. We are more than allies. We’re family. There are no countries with a stronger community of interest and values”*. The relationship is illustrated as almost fulfilling a service, something both nations are destined to achieve together: *“Our alliance exists to promote the universal decencies of humanity, not to threaten other countries”*.²¹⁷ In this type of rhetoric, there is no space for analyzing objectively the gains and costs from the relationship, rather the alliance has become an essential part of what Australia is and what it represents. In 2011, United States announced its policy of rebalancing to Asia, meaning it will increase diplomatic, economic and military ties with the region.²¹⁸ Australian policy makers accepted this change in the U.S focus without much debate or discussion on the impacts to Australia’s position. In Washington 2011, Gillard stated in her speech to the Congress:

“You have an ally in Australia. An ally for war and peace. An ally for hardship and prosperity. An ally for the sixty years past and Australia is an ally for all the years to come. Geography and history alone could never explain the strength of the commitment between us. Rather, our values are shared and our people are friends. This is the heart of our alliance. (...) An alliance which was strong in the Cold War ... an alliance which is strong in the new world. In both our countries, true friends stick together.”²¹⁹

President Obama echoed similar sentiments while visiting Australia in 2011, when announcing the rebalancing process. He highlighted the shared cultural and historical qualities of Australia

²¹⁵ Commonwealth of Australia, Department of Defence 2013, 10.

²¹⁶ Adler and Barnett 1998, 56.

²¹⁷ Abbott 13.6.2014.

²¹⁸ Rebalancing process has many aspects outside of security policy, especially in the economic sphere. This dissertation, however, focuses on the military impacts of the policy.

²¹⁹ Gillard, 10.3.2011.

and the United States: the history of settlers, democratic government, belief in equality and that everyone should have a “*fair go*” in a society. He noted that Australia and United States are the world’s “*two oldest democracies*” and “*two oldest friends*”. He also mentioned the importance of Australia invoking the ANZUS treaty after 9/11, for the first time, showing how they “*stood together in the crises*”. Regarding the rebalancing process Obama stated: “*Our new focus on this region reflects a fundamental truth -- the United States has been, and always will be, a Pacific nation.*” He said United States welcomes the rise of a “prosperous and peaceful” China and that it seeks to build a cooperative relationship. Communications between the American and Chinese militaries are to be increased in order to increase understanding and avoid miscalculations. At the same time Washington is open with Beijing about the importance of international norms and human rights within China.²²⁰ The speech thus repeats the normal American China policy: they support the rise of China as long as China co-operates, keeps its military forces in check and participates in the international norms and respects the laws. It also resembles Australia’s positions on these same issues, showing there are no major differences in the perspectives of the two nations or that Australia is willing to adopt the positions of United States without much criticism.

Official security policy reflects the ideas of the Prime Minister Abbott and president Obama. In a closely coupled security community, states have a high level of military integration and share goals regarding security, thus building cooperative security to counter threats coming from outside the community. As a result from the high level of trust, members tend to develop their militaries together and by pooling power. This happens especially when military cooperation was part of the early cooperation.²²¹ Military cooperation was always a feature of Australia-U.S alliance, beginning from the wars in Korea and Vietnam. In the NSS 2013, U.S alliance is mentioned as critical to Australia’s “ability to deter and defeat adversaries”. It does not detail, however, what these adversaries are. NSS also outlines plans for strengthening the interoperability of the American and Australian defence forces and sustaining an effective intelligence relationship.²²² There is a clear commitment to American goals in the Pacific, and military cooperation with the two countries. Australia also views the rebalancing process as a positive development, continuing the U.S presence in the region. U.S extended deterrence, the commitment to aid its allies in case of an attack, is seen as a way of preserving a stable security

²²⁰ Obama 2011.

²²¹ Adler and Barnett 1998, 56.

²²² Commonwealth of Australia, Department of the Prime Minister and the Cabinet 2013, 17.

environment. As part of the American rebalancing process, Australia made further commitments to the U.S alliance to enhance the “*longstanding, well-established defence cooperation*”. In 2011 Prime minister Gillard and President Obama announced the deployment of up to 2500 U.S Marine Corps to the Northern Territory in rotational basis to participate in exercises and training with the ADF. In addition, the Royal Australian air force and the U.S air force are increasing cooperation and this process will bring rotations of U.S aircrafts through northern Australia. These commitments are described as a “*natural development in the bilateral relationship*” and as a way to support regional security cooperation.²²³ Prime Minister Gillard stated the following:

“So I'm very pleased to be able to announce with President Obama that we've agreed joint initiatives to enhance our alliance -- 60 years old and being kept robust for tomorrow. It is a new agreement to expand the existing collaboration between the Australian Defence Force and the U.S. Marine Corps and the U.S. Air Force. What this means in very practical detail is from mid-2012, Australia will welcome deployments of a company-size rotation of 200 to 250 Marines in the Northern Territory for around six months at a time.”²²⁴

Gillard's statement confirms Australia's policy of maintaining a “robust” military alliance in the future. Australia and United States also have regular high level meetings regarding security policy. In 2012 Australia-US Ministerial Meeting (AUSMIN) two countries announced the first rotation of U.S Marines to be a success and agreed to continue the process in an “*incremental and considered manner*”. In addition, cooperation regarding space and communications was announced and that a Space Surveillance Telescope will be relocated to Australia in order to aid the U.S ability to monitor space assets.²²⁵ Intelligence cooperation has been a controversial issue in Australia. However, White Paper 2013 commits Australia to explore further opportunities to support U.S defence communications capabilities and the possibility of establishing a combined communications gateway in Western Australia. Australia already has a Joint Defence Facility in Pine Gap that serves both countries' intelligence collection capabilities and provides Australia intelligence on terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and military developments. This facility is considered an essential part of Australia's national defence and the alliance. White paper declares that all activities in Pine

²²³ Commonwealth of Australia, Department of Defence 2013, 10.

²²⁴ Gillard, 16.11. 2011

²²⁵ Commonwealth of Australia, Department of Defence 2013, 57.

Gap happen under close coordination by the Australian government and that Australia has the sovereign right to approve or deny any activities.²²⁶ Australian policy makers struggle in an effort to on one hand, appraise the military cooperation with United States as useful to its interests and on the other hand, to convince the regional neighbors that this cooperation is not directed against them and that Australia still remains an independent actor.

In a tightly coupled security community, however, states are bound to lose some of their sovereignty.

“While states comprising on the security community are still sovereign in a formal-legalistic sense, their sovereignty, authority and legitimacy is contingent on the security community in two aspects. First, while a security community does not erode the state’s legitimacy or replace the state, the more tightly coupled a security community is the more the state’s role will be transformed.(...) Hence, states in a tightly coupled arrangement, while retaining their juridical sovereign status toward the outside world, can be seen as agents of the transnational community.”²²⁷

As a member of the alliance, then, Australia must always consider American interests in addition to its own. As much as Australian policy makers wish to claim otherwise, in a security community, members lose some part of their sovereignty, as they must act on behalf of the community. This also impacts the way other countries view Australian foreign policy. At the same time, Australia is a middle weight power and can only have a limited impact on its security situation, which is largely defined by events outside of influence of Australia’s policy makers.²²⁸ This position, Australia’s limited ability to influence the events in its region and the feeling of insecurity, largely initiated the cooperation with stronger states in the first place. Yet the same insecurity has not left Australian security policy even if it is part of a military alliance now.

At the early stages of the security community, powerful states can provide the leadership and ideology for the integration process, making the transition to deeper levels easier. Larger and stronger states form the “cores of strength” around which the security community can develop.²²⁹ Adler and Barnett refer to power working as a “magnet”, pulling weaker states into

²²⁶ Commonwealth of Australia, Department of Defence 2013, 58.

²²⁷ Adler and Barnett 1998, 36.

²²⁸ O’Neill 2011, 33.

²²⁹ Deutch et al 1957, 38.

cooperation in hope of protection and other benefits.²³⁰ Powerful states can provide payments and protection for the other members in the community. Thus power itself becomes an important factor in a security community: “*Power is not simply coercive but conveys a sense of purpose and, potentially, a vision of the future*”.²³¹ Adler and Barnett view power as a positive element, as it can push the cooperation between states forward. However, if the powerful state provides the purpose and leadership in the initial stages of the security community, this might stay as the status quo for the entire time the community exists. Australia has largely adopted American policies and images of threat from the beginning of the alliance in 1951. Firstly, cooperation was built against the fear of Communist expansion and later, terrorism took place as the main foreign threat. Australia and United States share similar values such as belief in liberal markets and international law. This was manifested in the free trade agreement in 2005. AUSFTA was criticized in that the Howard government prioritized strategic ties with the U.S to the extent that it agreed to a trade agreement that was more favorable to the United States.²³² This process shows how difficult it is for a “junior ally” to maintain its own interests in the community with a super power.²³³

Cooperation in military matters began from a mutual threat, which was seen as communist expansion in Asia during the Cold War. It has developed further during the past decades and again Australia has supported United States in its security policy focus to Asia. Despite the continuous discussion within Australian academics and policy elite on the issue of whether Australia should cut ties with Washington and focus on Asia, based on the security documents the relationship is still close and resembles a closely coupled security community. There are no signs pointing that Australia is officially rethinking its policy towards the United States and the current Abbott government continues to support it strongly.

4.5. Nascent community with China?

Higgott and Nossal detail the difficulties Australia came across when attempting to build a community within the Asia-Pacific. Aside from the question of identity, other problems arose

²³⁰ Adler and Barnett 1998, 40.

²³¹ Ibid, 52.

²³² Beeson 2003, 203.

²³³ See more regarding the tensions in Australia’s economic relationship with the United States: Ravenhill, John (2001). “Allies but not friends: the economic relationship”, *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 55, No. 2, 249–259.

such as: how to determine the boundaries for a community, what ideology the community could be based around and thirdly, that Australia was not viewed as part of “Asia” by other Asian countries. They note that Australia did push for regional cooperation regarding APEC, for example, but that cooperation did not exceed much further. They conclude that if a security community in the region should emerge, it is not clear that Australia would be a part of it.²³⁴ China is not mentioned exclusively in Higgott and Nossal’s analysis but has since become the most important partner, in economic terms, for Australia. In this chapter I review Australia’s security policy regarding China and argue, that a nascent community can be seen to exist between the two countries. Many obstacles are still in the way of further cooperation, mainly those created by different governmental systems, lack of communication and understanding and regional tensions.

At the nascent phase of a security community, conditions trigger the cooperation between states. They usually have both material and normative aspects and could occur as a common military threat; changes in the distribution of military power; events that change the material structures and mindsets; or transnational processes that create common interests. After the initial push for cooperation, interaction starts to increase between states and their peoples and eventually, some form of organizations are created to maintain trust between them. At this point, states do not yet purposefully seek to build a community: rather they look for ways to increase their security, lower transaction costs and encourage future interactions.²³⁵

The triggering conditions that could push Australia to seek closer relationship and especially ways of increasing mutual trust with China are stated clearly in the policy documents. Security policy documents start with the notion that the regional strategic environment is changing. White Paper 2009 assumes that China will continue to grow and possibly take over United States as the biggest market by 2020 and accordingly, America’s standing in the region will be challenged. This change has both normative and material effects. Material in the sense that following China’s continuous economic growth, it has significantly increased its military budget and power projection abilities and also become more assertive in regional issues such as territorial claims in the South China Sea. Normative in the sense that this process is viewed by Australia as changing the whole power structure in the region and negatively affecting the ability of United States to stay in control in the way it has for the past decades in the Asia-

²³⁴ Higgott and Nossal 1998, 281-287.

²³⁵ Adler and Barnett 1998, 52-53.

Pacific. Changes in the material power relations have normative consequences as they change the way states view each other and each other's intentions. Australia's own relative ability to influence others in the region is seen to be affected as well. These conditions have already led to Australia seeking closer economic cooperation in the region. Interaction at other levels is especially called for in the 2012 White Paper by increasing Australia's diplomatic posture in the region, facilitating more student exchanges and attracting more skilled immigrants from Asia to Australia. Australia is seeking to become "*Asia-literate and Asia-capable nation*".²³⁶ As China has become the largest and most important trade partner for Australia it aims, as predicted by the theory, to increase further cooperation. It wants to cut back on transaction costs as well as looking at ways to enhance security relationship with China. According to the theory the change in the environment and strategic situation, followed by increasing interaction between China and Australia, should lead to the institution of organizations to increase mutual trust.²³⁷

As Australia is a middle power with a limited amount of influence, the U.S-China relationship and its management are seen as the most influential factor impacting the region and its stability. Miscalculation and confrontation between United States and China are seen as possible, especially regarding Taiwan. In order to clarify its own position, Australia confirms its one China policy.²³⁸ The view that a growing power will automatically challenge the current hegemon has underlying neorealist assumptions. This view assumes that China's growing power will inevitably cause a restructuring of the original order and that these changes have possible negative outcomes in the form of tensions or even physical conflict. In 2013 this outlook changes slightly. "*Australia sees the most likely future as one in which the United States and China are able to maintain a constructive relationship encompassing both competition and cooperation.*"²³⁹ Australia officially "*welcomes China's rise*" and does not view China as an adversary. China's growing military power is seen as a legitimate outcome of its growth and the economic progress as beneficial to both the Chinese people but also other countries such as Australia in reducing the effects of the global economic downturn.²⁴⁰ Australia's China policy is articulated as follows:

²³⁶ Australian Embassy, 2012.

²³⁷ Adler and Barnett 1998, 53-54.

²³⁸ Commonwealth of Australia, Department of Defence 2009, 33.

²³⁹ Commonwealth of Australia, Department of Defence 2013, 9.

²⁴⁰ Commonwealth of Australia, Department of Defence 2013, 11.

“(…) China’s importance to Australia, economically and politically, will only grow in decades to come. We welcome China’s rise, not just because of the economic and social benefits it has brought China’s people and the region (including Australia), but because it deepens and strengthens the entire international system. We have consistently supported the reform of global institutions to make them more representative of the large emerging economies and the modern world. We accept that China’s military growth is a natural, legitimate outcome of its growing economy and broadening interests. It is important that China and others in the region explain to their neighbours the pace and scope of their military modernisation to build confidence and trust.”²⁴¹

This is a positive outlook on China’s growing influence, yet it also highlights the worries Australia has – in particular about what China’s intentions are with its extensive military build-up.

Australia officially states that no choice between the alliance with the U.S and extending the relationship with China needs to be made.²⁴² With the extensive academic and policy level debate about Australia’s position and relationship regarding the U.S and China, this is a confident statement from the government. It states that there is no conflict of interest between using U.S extended deterrence and adding military cooperation under the ANZUS alliance and at the same time extending economic and other cooperation with China. As Australian government states in the 2009 White paper, a policy of self-reliance is followed and aid from the U.S is expected only if it comes under an attack from a major power and Australia’s own capabilities are not sufficient for defence. However the White Papers fail to articulate what threats increased military cooperation with the United States and the extended deterrence (including nuclear deterrence) are aimed for.²⁴³ In a security community, states “*do not undertake – indeed, do not consider – security actions that can be interpreted by others within the community as militarily threatening*”. There is an expectation of peaceful management of possible disputes.²⁴⁴ This peaceful expectation is not yet evident in Australia’s relationship with its region, including countries such as Indonesia and China. First of all, an increased U.S military presence in the Northern Territory is “*security action*” that could be perceived as threatening by Asian nations north of Australia, such as Indonesia. Strategically it makes sense for the United States, under its policy of rebalance and aim to extend its reach in the Pacific.

²⁴¹ Commonwealth of Australia 2012, 228.

²⁴² Commonwealth of Australia, Department of Defence 2013, 11.

²⁴³ Commonwealth of Australia, Department of Defence 2009, 50; Commonwealth of Australia, Department of Defence 2013, 29.

²⁴⁴ Adler and Barnett 1998, 34.

The benefits of the military base for Australia are not clearly stated in the security policy. Prime Minister Gillard stated the following:

“We are a region that is growing economically. But stability is important for economic growth, too. And our alliance has been a bedrock of stability in our region. So building on our alliance through this new initiative is about stability. It will be good for our Australian Defence Force to increase their capabilities by joint training, combined training, with the U.S. Marines and personnel. It will mean that we are postured to better respond together, along with other partners in the Asia Pacific, to any regional contingency, including the provision of humanitarian assistance and dealing with natural disasters.”²⁴⁵

Here the cooperation is mainly explained by technical reasons (increasing the compatibility of Australian and U.S troops) and the ability to use Australian troops outside of Australia for regional operations or humanitarian assistance. It is quite clear, however, that humanitarian assistance would not require a rotational base of U.S marines. Australian and American troops are already well qualified to work together and have a long history of doing so, most recently in Afghanistan and Iraq. They also regularly train together, so a base is not required solely for this reason. The decision emphasizes Australia’s view that United States is the key to “stabilizing” the region. The base provides opportunities for “*regional contingency*” which could include handling tensions that may escalate in the South China Sea. The decision received criticism from Australia’s academic elite, most questioning the purpose of the base and the long-term impacts to Australia’s international reputation especially among the Asian neighbors.²⁴⁶ The base already received some negative reactions from the leadership of China and Indonesia, Chinese commentators calling it a strategy of encirclement by the United States.²⁴⁷ This decision shows that the security paradox identified by Higgott and Nossall in Australia’s defence policy in the 80’s and 90’s, still exists. While Australia speaks of multilateral cooperation and regional security, it continues to protect itself from the same region by extending military cooperation with the United States.

Yet Australia aspires to convince China that these changes are not directed against it. Consider the following:

“This is not a world in which anything like a containment policy can work or be in our national interests: compared with the Cold War period, our mutual

²⁴⁵ Gillard 2011.

²⁴⁶ See The Conversation 10.11.2011 for a collection of views on the issue.

²⁴⁷ See The Guardian 16.11.2011; ABC news 26.4.2013.

interests are much deeper and ideological differences much less marked. We want, therefore, to **deepen our already close and cooperative relationship with China at every level, including enhancing our defence cooperation.** We come to the relationship with China as a dependable economic partner, a constructive participant in regional affairs, one of the world's oldest democracies, a good international citizen, and a close ally of the United States. **None of these dimensions will change.** Together they offer the strongest possible foundation for engagement with China and the region as a whole."²⁴⁸ (emphasis added)

This statement can be seen to be directed at the United States, which had announced its rebalancing process just a year before the publication of the document in 2012. Australia has welcomed the process and the enhanced United States presence in the region. On the one hand, Canberra is clearly stating it will not be a part of any process by Washington where it aims to contain China or limit its access to the region. This form of policy would, after all, directly harm Australia's economic interests. Rather Australia is calling to expand its cooperation with China, including in military affairs. On the other hand, Australia confirms that it remains a close U.S ally and this will not change in the future.

While China's growing military capabilities are seen as a legitimate outcome, clear worries over the intentions and purposes of its plans are voiced as well. China is regarded the strongest Asian military power and its power projection capabilities are likely to grow in the future. It is estimated that China will benefit from the relative gain in power as the global economic crises will in turn affect Western countries negatively. White Paper 2009 is vague on the details of these risks that military modernization could bring for the region and specifically for Australia. It notes that *"the pace, scope and structure of China's military modernization have the potential to give its neighbors cause for concern if not carefully explained, and if China does not reach out to others to build confidence regarding its military plans"*. The long-term strategic purpose of the military build-up is questioned, since its capabilities are potentially beyond what is required to defend Taiwan.²⁴⁹ However, Australian policy makers are unwilling to articulate those worries from Canberra's point of view and speak in general terms, using *"regional states"* as the reference point. The same vague concern is implied regarding China's participation in the regional security environment and the rules-based global order, including the global economic system.²⁵⁰ White Paper 2009 voices concerns that China will have more

²⁴⁸ Commonwealth of Australia 2012, 229.

²⁴⁹ Commonwealth of Australia, Department of Defence 2009, 34.

²⁵⁰ Commonwealth of Australia, Department of Defence 2009, 34.

and more power in the global economic and political system, and Canberra is unsure how willing China is to embrace the same rules-based order that Australia and United States both support. China's intentions are clearly not well known by the Australian policy makers and they also do not have a desire to state the exact worries that Australia might have. Australia thus acknowledges that there is a need to build a deeper understanding of China's security policies: defence relationship should be developed in order to encourage transparency on China's military capabilities and intentions. Defence Strategic Dialogue has been upgraded to a higher level and more educational and professional exchanges are called for.²⁵¹ An asymmetrical partnership can work best when the two countries share same major values, as stated earlier. Deutch and his colleagues argued that a non-democratic form of government per say does not prevent a security community with democratic countries, unless it is clearly connected to militarist ideology. Australia and China clearly have different values on many issues, such as democratic processes and human rights. These concerns can prevent cooperation from continuing on from the nascent phase to the next one, unless Australia is willing to overlook these issues. In the security policy it largely already does, only vaguely calling for China to commit to rules-based order. It does not challenge China's position on specific issues and this is evident in relation to the disputes in the South China Sea, which will be discussed next.

Regional territorial disputes are an important concern for all nations in the region, including Australia. Due to these disputes, China's growing strategic influence and unwillingness to deal with multilateral institutions have come into light. More than half of Australia's trade travels through these waters and thus freedom of navigation should be emphasized in the security policy.²⁵² One expects careful analysis of the recent tensions in the South China Sea in strategic planning. Several nations have disputes over the ocean territory in the South China Sea and thus the right to utilize the region's extensive oil and gas resources. China, Vietnam, Taiwan, Malaysia, and Brunei have competing claims over territory and freedom of navigation is another difficult issue. It is particularly important to China and the United States, specifically to the movement of U.S military vessels in China's exclusive economic zone (EEZ).²⁵³ White Paper notes that "*events in the South China Sea may well reflect how a rising China and its neighbors manage their relationships.*"²⁵⁴

²⁵¹ Ibid, 95.

²⁵² Wesley 2013, 49.

²⁵³ Glaser 2012, 1.

²⁵⁴ Commonwealth of Australia, Department of Defence 2013, 12.

And:

“These have the potential to destabilize regional security owing to the risk of miscalculations or small incidents leading to escalation. Establishing effective mechanisms to help manage these pressure points will be increasingly important. Australia wishes to see a peaceful regional strategic order with deeper understanding, clearer communication and more effective and reliable rules.”²⁵⁵

Considering how crucial these naval routes and their operations are to Australia, this statement lacks detail. Australia fears miscalculation may occur between states and *wishes* for a peaceful strategic order. Australia’s official stance is that it will not take a position on the competing claims and encourages parties to resolve issues according to the international law and the UN Convention of the Law of the Sea.²⁵⁶ As Wesley argues, Australian officials have decided on a largely risk averse position towards the disputes, claiming it has no direct interests. This is in contrast to Australia’s previous active participation in crises it has not been directly involved in but aimed to solve.²⁵⁷ Australia’s lack of activism on the issue is expected, considering that China is a party to many of the disputes and has been rather assertive in the claims for territory. China petitions the right for over 90 percent of the South China Sea.²⁵⁸ Wesley argues that: *“On the one hand, the loud protestations that Australia has no role in resolving the disputes appears to be motivated by a fear of offending China, Australia’s largest trading partner and an increasingly important regional actor. On the other, Australia’s advocacy for a Code of Conduct demonstrates a desire to keep the countries of ASEAN on side.”*²⁵⁹ Australian policy makers struggle in the White Papers to on the one hand, trying to push international (rather ambitious) agenda and on the other, not to make bold statements against China’s interests.

China wants to deal with the disputes bilaterally while other nations are calling for multilateral management via international institutions. Philippines has filed a case against China in the United Nations tribunal, to seek arbitration for the territorial disputes. China and Philippines have been in disagreement over Scarborough Shoal area in the South China Sea and near the Philippines coast. China wants to deal directly with Philippines, while Philippines argues it is a multilateral issue with many countries involved and thus needs to be resolved multilaterally.

²⁵⁵ Commonwealth of Australia, Department of Defence 2013, 11.

²⁵⁶ Commonwealth of Australia 2012, 237.

²⁵⁷ Wesley 2013, 46.

²⁵⁸ Reuters 18.3.2015.

²⁵⁹ Wesley 2013, 47.

China has ratified the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), yet is not forced to obey as it has reserved the right to not be bound by international tribunals.²⁶⁰

“Australia has interests in the peaceful resolution of territorial and maritime disputes including in the South China Sea in accordance with international law, the prevention of aggression within Southeast Asia, and freedom of navigation and maritime security in the region’s sea lanes. We support a resilient regional community to help achieve these objectives and mitigate strategic risks and reduce the chances of misjudgement or miscalculation. Australia’s continuing commitment to the Five Power Defence Arrangements and our strong defence relationships with Singapore and Malaysia serve these interests, as does our commitment to maintaining a broad network of bilateral defence and security relationships and multilateral frameworks.”²⁶¹

These disputes can pose a clear threat to the stability of the region if not managed properly and yet Australia’s defence strategy lacks detail regarding the issue. If Australia is hoping to support building a community in the region that resolves disputes peacefully (White Paper 2009) and since the stability of the region is a strategic priority to Australia, then these issues should warrant a closer examination in the most significant security strategy documents.

In the political rhetoric, relationship with China is seen as a way to gain benefits. Australia needs the region for economic cooperation. Even though Abbott notes that the relationships include “*so much more than trade*”, he describes the relationships as friendship and as seeking mutual gains, rather than sharing the essential values and identity as with the United States. Regarding China, Abbott highlights the “special friendship” between the two countries and the historical importance of China to Australia and adds that the cooperation is deeper than previously, involving education, arts and business. It is also noted that as any friendships, this is not one without its problems. Abbott repeats in his statements the view that investing in another country is a sign of trust. It follows that China’s 60 billion investments in Australia and Australia’s 40 billion in China, show how much the two countries trust one another, despite political differences: “*Australia’s investment of about \$40 billion in China, with a very different legal and political system, is much more than just a bet on the world’s coming economic superpower.*”²⁶² Trust between Australia and Asian nations is something to be earned from mutual cooperation and trade, not something already in place from shared identity and values as with United States.

²⁶⁰ The New York Times 23.9.2014; 15.12.2014.

²⁶¹ Commonwealth of Australia, Department of Defence 2013, 25-26.

²⁶² Abbott, 11.4.2014.

At the practical level, some evolution in the Australia-China military relationship has been achieved. Australia and China hold an annual Defence Strategic Dialogue between the Department of Defence and the People's Liberation Army. In 2013, the bilateral relationship was labeled as a "strategic partnership" and the two countries will hold annual bilateral ministerial level Foreign and Strategic Dialogue and Strategic Economic Dialogue. The senior level defence dialogue with China has continued over 15 years and has been extended to include working level exchanges, practical cooperation in humanitarian assistance, maritime engagement and peace-keeping.²⁶³ At the next level of a security community, ascendant level, countries come to have increasingly dense interaction, military cooperation and decreased fear of the other as a threat. Countries come to act together and this in turn deepens the level of mutual trust.²⁶⁴ While there are indeed some of these steps slowly taking place in the Australia-China relationship, as with the military cooperation and institutions, there is still clear concern of China's intentions in the policy papers. Based on those concerns combined with the increasing cooperation with the United States, I argue that the level of cooperation is still at the *nascent* level in security policy. It has potential to extend further, but despite Australia's focus it places on regional changes and the need to find new ways to navigate the "Asian century", in security policy it has remained largely in the domain of the old alliance with the United States. Australia clearly also has difficulty in clearly articulating its own concerns in the region. China's behavior regarding territorial claims on the one hand, and Australia's own policy choices in increasing military cooperation with the United States, both place some strain on the relationship. These issues highlight how difficult it is to move from a one phase to another in building a security community and that increased cooperation might not be enough in doing so, even though Deutch and his colleagues were very optimistic on this front. Australia's increased links with the region and their impacts on its security policy are discussed in the next chapter.

4.6. Increasing interdependence with the region

In 2009, Australia estimated that the global economic crises could have an impact on the power relativities, to benefit China. Any reduction in the U.S capabilities and presence in the Asia-Pacific region, as a result of this, is seen as negative to Australia's interests.²⁶⁵ Australia now

²⁶³ Commonwealth of Australia, Department of Defence 2013, 62.

²⁶⁴ Adler and Barnett 1998, 53.

²⁶⁵ Commonwealth of Australia, Department of Defence, 32.

has increasingly tight economic ties to the region and as a result, is more dependent on the regional partners than old economic partners such as the United Kingdom and the United States. Official policy predicts that economic weight will move to the East from the West, as shown by the current financial downturn. Australia survived the financial crises without falling into a recession, even though the economy slowed down.²⁶⁶ Australia's better performance during the global crises is seen as a positive result due to cooperation with the region. It is evident that Australian policy makers do not see United States and Europe being able to return to the pre-crises situation. Slow growth in the West is expected and this in turn promotes even further integration with the region. These factors keep pushing Australia to seek ways to engage with Asia, despite its continued reliance on the United States on security matters.

There have been a lot of suggestions to create an Asia-only community, based on local values and interests. Regional organizations, such as ASEAN, already exist but do not comprise the whole region.²⁶⁷ Australia seemingly promotes the idea of a regional, Asian community in White Paper 2009:

“The Government's approach to enhancing strategic stability in the Asia-Pacific region is to work to strengthen the regional security architecture so that it embraces the United States, Japan, China, India, Indonesia and other regional states within a **community** that is able to engage in the full spectrum of dialogue, cooperation and action on economic and political matters, as well as future challenges related to security. The Government has proposed the development of an Asia Pacific Community by 2020 as a means of strengthening political, economic and security cooperation in the region in the long-term. Success in that endeavour will bring many benefits, not least by easing our defence planning challenges.”²⁶⁸ (emphasis added)

This is a strong statement in support of a regional security community and the same statement repeated in 2013 White Paper, where support for the ASEAN regional forum and East Asia Summit is also demonstrated.²⁶⁹ Australia acknowledges that the current status quo regarding defence planning is challenging for Australia: there are issues that need mending.

However, the previous announcement is followed by a statement supporting the United States to underwrite any cooperation:

“The Government's judgement is that strategic stability in the region is best underpinned by the **continued presence of the United States** through its network

²⁶⁶ Commonwealth of Australia, Office of Prime Minister and Cabinet 2013, 9.

²⁶⁷ Jain 2007, 29.

²⁶⁸ Ibid, 43.

²⁶⁹ Commonwealth of Australia 2013, Department of Defence 26.

of alliances and security partnerships, including with Japan, the Republic of Korea, India and Australia, and by significant levels of US military capability continuing to be located in the Western Pacific.”²⁷⁰ (emphasis added)

In 2013, Australia continues with a similar statement: “*Australia strongly supports the continued engagement and enhanced presence of the United States in the region*”.²⁷¹ Even if Australia is calling for a security community in Asia-Pacific, it is clear that this arrangement should be underpinned by continued U.S hegemony and thus would not be an “Asia-only” community. Security community imposed by the United States might not be as plausible as Australia imagines. As Mastanduno has argued, United States has failed to include China in its security order, as it has done with Japan. He notes that it is unlikely to see this situation changing or even that U.S would be willing to share power with China. There is no certainty over whether it would be in the interest of United States to include Japan and China in the same security community and resolve existing issues, as it is possible that a balancing coalition against its own interests could occur.²⁷² However, if a community with closer cooperation should occur, its norms could then constitute China to participate more actively in the rules-based order United States and Australia support and this would serve the interests of both countries²⁷³.

Australia is trying to enhance the cultural and people to people links with the region. For example, Asian studies are added to curriculums, Asian languages taught more and schools required to have connections with Asian schools.²⁷⁴ Immigration from the region is encouraged, as long as the movers are highly skilled in order to benefit Australian society.²⁷⁵ Australia clearly separates its own (Western) culture from those of its neighbors:

“The perspectives of Australia’s neighbours vary widely. Some share our views, including on issues of principle, while others differ. Divergences between our cultures and systems sometimes compound inevitable frictions. So our policy responses will be shaped by the broad objective of building trust. That means making every effort to build between the states of the region (and globally) deeper understanding, greater transparency, clearer communications, more effective and reliable rules and dependable markets.”²⁷⁶

²⁷⁰ Ibid.

²⁷¹ Ibid, 27.

²⁷² See Mastanduno 2002, 183-184, 200.

²⁷³ On Australia’s views on rules based order, see for example White Paper 2009, 43-44.

²⁷⁴ Commonwealth of Australia 2012, 15.

²⁷⁵ Ibid, 252.

²⁷⁶ Ibid, 229.

Links with the region have become increasingly important and the whole White Paper 2012 focuses on ways of building Australia's competence in the region.

“Importantly, our links with Asia are social and cultural as much as they are political and economic. The arts, culture and creativity play an important role in strengthening Australia's relationships with people in Asia. Australia's cultural strengths underpin values of respect, understanding and inclusion that help to connect people, business, institutions and governments across the region.”²⁷⁷

Australia intends to focus its diplomatic network to the region in the future. In 2012, 42 percent of Australia's staff of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade were based in Asia. In comparison, 11 percent were based in North, Central and South America and 16 percent in Europe. New posts have been opened in Asia in recent years. The amount of posts is seen as a form of competition for influence between countries, as rest of the world is also increasing their number of posts within Asia. Australia's diplomatic network and capacity is seen to lack behind the growing level of interests the country has within the region.²⁷⁸ This competition for influence is based on the economic growth and possibilities emerging in the growing markets. Australia does not want to lose its long earned influence and contacts in the region to “newcomers” who wish to gain from the growing economies. It has thus come from a country that went to great lengths to keep Asian immigration away to a country that wants to connect with the region diplomatically and attract skilled Asian immigrants to Australia. In this area, Asia is seen as the region of opportunities in business and education. It is in the area of security – illegal movement of people, non-governmental actors, terrorism movements and lack of resources – where Asia remains a place of disorder and danger. Question is, can Australian policy makers successfully entertain these two images and yet maintain good relationships within the region?

Diplomatic concerns do exist in the policy papers. Australia is not convinced of its public image and influence in the region and ambitions do not always meet the reality. Concern is voiced over Australia's reputation as it is better among G8 countries than countries in the region.²⁷⁹ Australia is utilizing public diplomacy strategically to improve its image in the region. Country strategies are being developed, firstly regarding China, India, Indonesia, Japan and South Korea due to their growing political, strategic and economic importance to Australia. Australia also

²⁷⁷ Ibid, 252.

²⁷⁸ Commonwealth of Australia 2012, 253-254.

²⁷⁹ Commonwealth of Australia 2012, 263.

developed a public diplomacy strategy for India in 2009-2010 to repair its damaged image and reputation due to attacks against Indian students in Australia.²⁸⁰ In 2009, attacks on Indian students in Australia caused public outrage and protests of over 2000 people. The attacks caused trouble between the official relations between India and Australia. Prime minister Rudd made a statement on the issue in June 2009:

“I speak on behalf of all Australians when I say that we deplore and condemn these attacks. (...) I said to Prime Minister Singh that the more than 90,000 Indian students in Australia are welcome guests in our country. I also said that the more than 200,000 Australians of Indian descent are welcome members of the Australian family. (...) Australia is a country of great diversity, harmony and tolerance.

We are a multicultural nation and we respect and embrace diversity – diversity which has enriched our nation.”²⁸¹

The issue of racism is not new to Australia, as has been shown in the previous chapters regarding Australia’s foreign policy. Discriminating “White Australia” immigration policy was only repelled in the 1970’s. Racial tensions intensified again after the 9/11 and the subsequent participation by Australia in American wars. In 2005, Cronulla race riots broke out and thousands of white Anglo-Australian men gathered to attack Australians with Middle Eastern outlook.²⁸² Cronulla riots are only one example of racial tensions that occurred in Australia in the 2000’s. They also show that Australia’s policy of integrating with Asia has not been completely successful. Kevin Rudd’s statement shows that Australia still feels the need to articulate to its neighbors that Australia is a “multicultural” country that respects “diversity”.

Australia’s links with the region regarding business, education and tourism are strongly emphasized in the 2012 White Paper. A good reputation among emerging economies in Asia is especially important considering Australia has a large export sector of providing international education, worth billions of dollars.²⁸³ This sector is particularly dependent on good public image and the view that Asian youth have about Australia, more than sales of other material products such as iron or gold. Even though Australia has extensive people to people links with

²⁸⁰ Ibid, 259.

²⁸¹ Rudd, 2009.

²⁸² See Collins, 2007.

²⁸³ Official statistics by Australian Education International put education as the third highest export industry after iron and coal, with 15 billion Australian dollars in 2012 (AEI, 2012). However, Birrell and Smith argue that the number is closer to half, when income earned in Australia by the students is adjusted for and students’ spending on living expenses and fees in Australia is estimated more modestly. They put education industry sixth largest after the export of iron ore, coal, gold, petroleum products and tourism services (Birrell and Smith, 2010).

the region, in academia, business and political sector, with a large amount of immigrants from the neighboring countries, it is still not comfortably part of Asia.

4.7. Conclusions

Previous chapters analyzed Australian security policy in 2008 until 2015 in relation to Higgott and Nossal's work. Australian security policy regarding threats, regional security, U.S alliance, China and regional interdependence were reviewed. Australian policy makers, especially Gillard government in 2012 White Paper, have laid out ambitious plans in how to make Australia more emerged with the region. Assumption behind this policy is that in the future, economic growth will come mostly from Asia, as Western countries continue to be stalled by the economic recession. New order in security policy is seen to take place: as China and other Asian nations grow, they improve their militaries and the relative position of Australia and other Western nations is in decline. Australian policy makers refer to "Asian century" and gladly see themselves as part of this new era of prosperity, focused on their backyard. Plans are thus laid out regarding trade, diplomacy and security policy to enhance Australia's position and to increase the links with the region. However, at the same time, Australian military policy remains tied to the "old world" as Higgott and Nossal described it. Military alliance with the United States has been enhanced by adding a U.S navy base in the Northern Territory; cooperation between navies will be enhanced and intelligence collaboration expanded on. Australia has, without much critical debate, decided to support American rebalancing to Asia, a policy which by many is seen as an effort to contain China's rise. Australia-China cooperation can be viewed as a nascent community, where all possibilities for further, deeper cooperation exist. Australian security policy thus seeks to convince China and other partners of its independence in international relations; yet there are issues such as China's military intentions that would require candid and open dialogue between the two nations. Australian security policy documents, however, avoid strong statements regarding China. Terrorism continues to be viewed as a threat for national security in addition to conventional threats, and the Abbott government's policies regarding asylum seekers, enhanced anti-terrorism laws and enforcement of border controls all serve as signposts that at the level of security, Australia has not taken many steps to integrate with the region, even though ambitious policy is set in place at the level of rhetoric.

5. Results

5.1. Two images of Asia

The analysis started with Higgott and Nossal's work on Australia's search for a new security community in the 1980's and 1990's. Higgott and Nossal argue that despite the strong efforts by the Australian foreign policy elite and especially the Labor governments of Hawke and Keating, Australia did not manage to form a security community within the region. During the Liberal Howard government, Australia returned to the old security order and the American alliance. They found that the biggest obstacle to the regional security cooperation, which did manifest itself in for example a security agreement between Australia and Indonesia, was the lack of we-ness and shared identity between Asians and Australians. Australia remained in a liminal place, not quite part of the region yet not entirely belonging to the West either. The purpose of this dissertation was to analyze how Australia has developed its security policy regarding China and the United States in the timeframe of 2009-2013 and has it moved closer to building a security community with Asia, as it attempted in the 1980's and 1990's. The analysis was divided in five parts, dealing with threat perception, regional security, U.S alliance, China and regional interdependence.

Since 2008, Australian security policy planning is based on the idea of a new "*Asian Century*" and that strategic order in the Asia-Pacific region is in flux. According to the official documents analyzed here, Australian foreign policy elite agree that the old order is passing and China's position will be far more central in the future. Asian countries, notably China, India, Indonesia and South Korea, are rapidly growing their economies and thus also modernizing their military capabilities. Accordingly, Australian policy makers officially believe that Asia is the center of gravity for coming decades: the area where economic growth takes place and where Western countries are increasingly focusing their economic, military and political efforts. This change is already evident in the rebalancing process of the United States. Accordingly, Australia also must find new ways to cope in the new "*Asian century*" and the changing world order. Specific plans on how to embrace the region were laid out in the ambitious *Australia in the Asian Century White Paper 2012*, which emphasized multilateral cooperation and an institutional approach to foreign policy. Yet in the 2013 White Paper, American alliance is still notably underlined as the basis of Australian security policy. China's growth and military expansion are viewed as legitimate, yet concerns are voiced over their intentions.

Australian security policy is still focused on protecting Australian continent from an attack by a state or non-state actor. Other prominent fear in the security policy documents is that a state in the immediate neighborhood of Australia should collapse, causing chaos near Australia's borders. Even though Australian policy makers estimate Australia to be safe in the coming decades, there is clear worry regarding states with high levels of poverty and weak governmental systems. Another fear evident in security policy is terrorism, manifested in increased budget in homeland security and cooperation with states such as Indonesia and United States.

As a long standing part of a tightly coupled, mature security community with the United States, Australia has largely shared the images of threat with United States and also acted upon them by participating in military operations far away from Australia's region. This position, where Australia shares American foreign policy goals, has not changed in the recent years. At the rhetorical level Australian leaders voice support for the United States and at the practical level, interoperability is maintained between the militaries of the two countries. They share intelligence and technology and thus American alliance is seen as one of the pillars of Australia's defence policy, as a way of contributing to technology it otherwise could not afford. In 2011, as United States announced the rebalancing process, Gillard government welcomed it with enthusiasm and new military initiatives were launched between the two countries. Australia has thus accepted the military aspects of the United States' rebalance process. I argue that as a junior ally, Australia has been heavily influenced by the American leadership in the security matters. There is a lack of critical discussion of the benefits of the U.S alliance in both security documents and political rhetoric. Decisions, such as a new military base in Australian soil, were passed with little public discussion. In addition, Australia's other diplomatic and economic goals in the region can suffer if too much focus is on the United States. Australia supports the idea of building a security community within Asia and is actively promoting the work of ASEAN and other regional forums. However, all regional cooperation is seen to be better off when underlined by the U.S hegemon. There are no indications that Australia would support a new order built around China, for example. There is thus a clear gap between the rhetoric, accepting China's rise and embracing the "new order", and the actual policy choices made in the documents.

Australia has also largely adopted American attitude towards China: officially welcoming its growth yet remaining doubtful of its intentions and military expansion. Australian policy makers go to great lengths in assuring that China is not seen as an adversary and that it has a legitimate right to expand its military, but that it should also accept the international norms and abide by them. This policy lacks detail, especially regarding important issues such as freedom of navigation and the territorial disputes in the South China Sea. Security matters are clearly still difficult issue in the relationship and cooperation with China is built heavily around economic integration and people-to-people links.

According to the theory of security communities, this interdependence and increasing cooperation (which has already led to developing some institutions to handle military to military links) should eventually lead to the second phase of integration. This is also the aim of the policy papers, as they call for Australia to find new ways to manage in the “Asian century” and the competition it entails. At the level of trade and interaction, Australia is more connected with China than ever. In the 2012 White Paper, a strategy is put in place to increase Australia’s “Asia-literacy” by increasing migration (of skilled immigrants) to Australia, enabling more study and teaching exchanges and providing more teaching of Asian languages in Australian schools, for example. However, this policy in itself shows how separated Australia feels from its region – a need for a policy to increase understanding of Asian cultures and people. The policy has a clear purpose in increasing Australia’s ability to remain influential in the region despite other Asian countries “catching up” to its middle power status. An increase in diplomatic posts in the region is viewed as a means to maintain influence when other Western countries are focusing their efforts to the region as well.

Based on the analysis here, there is clear potential for deeper cooperation between Australia and China. It should be noted that lot of cooperation also occurs that has not been analyzed here due to the small scope of this dissertation. I conclude that Australia has created two “ideas” of Asia. There is a region which Australia needs in terms of trade, cultural exchanges and mutual interests. The other region, concerning security, is more complex and troubling. Growing military capabilities are seen to be changing the regional order which Australia judges to have been in its favor for the past decades. At the same time, illegal immigration, increasing competition over natural resources and fear of terrorism are all threats arising from the region that Australia is part of. Australian official policy claims to seek new solutions, yet it has decided to enhance the military cooperation with the United States. However, rather than lack

of shared values, I argue that this turn in policy is based on Australia's two images of Asia that are not connected. Australia has not been able to overcome its strategic culture, based on realist assumptions of the world, in order to extend the cooperation and transactions evident at so many levels with China and other countries into the level of security policy. Rather, it has insisted on keeping these two worlds separate and without much critical thinking or questioning from the point of view of its own national interests has supported the United States in its rebalancing process to Asia.

5.2. On security communities

According to Higgott and Nossal, it was the lack of "we-ness" and shared values that prevented Australia from fully embracing the region. Deutch's theory argues that security communities are a way of creating stable peace and if a whole world were to be integrated as one community, we would prevent war. In this final chapter, I comment on security communities as a concept based on my own dissertation and reflecting on Higgott and Nossal's work. I argue that in the case of Australia, it is precisely the *existing* security community that prevents it from fully integrating to its own region and thus achieving peaceful relationships with neighboring countries.

Higgott and Nossal focus on the role of values in Australia's struggle to build security ties with Asia. On the basis of this dissertation, it is relevant in addition to consider the role of the existing security community in impacting Australia's options. Higgott and Nossal do not question whether it is possible to belong to two security communities at once: they only focus on the effort to move from the liminal point "between the communities" to belonging to a new one. Based on the analysis of security policy documents between 2009 and 2015, I conclude that Australia has largely already chosen its security community, the alliance with the United States. Any efforts to further integration with the region are secondary to the relationship with the United States. Most of the integration has taken place at an economic level, and it seems difficult to embrace the next phase of building a community with China. However, unlike Higgott and Nossal's argument that it is mainly dependent on building shared values, I argue that Australia has thus far been able to discount the differences in value systems with China. Different governmental systems and China's violations of universal human rights have not stopped Australia from embracing China as its most important trade partner. Clear difficulties exist in

the relationship, and concerns are voiced in Australia regarding Chinese investments, for example. It has to be noted, however, that even though Australia advocates the rule of international law and the UN in solving disputes that China is involved in, Australia itself has become under scrutiny over the treatment of asylum seekers. The Abbott government is thus unlikely to make human rights a vocal point in the China relationship. As Deutch points out, some values can be depolitized in the security community. As long as Australia prioritizes the cooperation with United States, however, it will be unlikely it can fully achieve its ambitious goals in the region.

Security communities could deter cooperation rather than lead to one large community of peace as Deutch hoped for. Belonging to a community leads states to sharing a collective identity and values. This naturally causes them to also view those outside the community as different. That Australia “chose”, as Higgott and Nossal found, to remain in the old world of security in the 1990’s onwards, could also have had a major impact on the way Australia now views Asia. Considering the path-dependent nature of security communities as well, where choices come to persist and cost of change becomes high, the policy change for Australia might be even more difficult. The conclusions of this dissertation support McCraw’s view that Australia’s strategic culture is so prominent that there is no clear difference in the policies of Labor and Liberal governments. Fear of conventional military threats and the tendency to look for security through allies and deterrence forces have endured over the changes of governments.²⁸⁴ Burns and Eltham further confirm this view, as they note that “*distinct national strategic culture and organizational strategic subcultures endure beyond individual governments, placing potential limits on Australia’s interface with other Asia-Pacific strategic cultures in the future*”.²⁸⁵ McCraw, Burns and Eltham do not specifically analyze the role of the security alliance with the United States in forming this culture based on realist assumptions. Since Australia has been in a tight security community since 1951, it can well be argued that United States plays a major part in Australia’s strategic culture and the relationship it does and can have with its neighbors.

For further possible research, New Zealand, excluded by the United States in the security treaty, could offer a comparative case study for an examination of how the existing security community with the United States has impacted Australia’s own foreign policy and sovereignty. Further research could be implemented by looking at the impact that Australia’s security community

²⁸⁴ McCraw 2011, 74.

²⁸⁵ Burns & Eltham 2014, 187.

with the United States has had on its dominant, realist strategic culture and the way it views threats compared to New Zealand.

This dissertation began with a quotation by Mastanduno who noted that “*The United States has crafted a hegemonic strategy for the Asia-Pacific to serve its own geopolitical and economic interests*”. The most notable result of this dissertation is the lack of consideration by the Australian policy makers on its own national interests, separate from those of United States. The rebalance to Asia-Pacific process was accepted and promoted by the government, even though Australian official policy aims to embrace the region that will be the focus for the next decades. The existing security community might not always serve Australia’s interests, but it does not seem capable of embracing a new one just yet.

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